When The ‘Recalcitrant’ Prevails: Nigeria’s Loss in the IPOB Secessionist Struggle

22/04/2025 - Written by Rex Obiwuru

Introduction

In 2014, Nnamdi Kanu, a revolutionary of Igbo extraction and leader of the Indigenous People of Biafra (IPOB) movement, emerged to campaign for the separation of Biafra from Nigeria. He premised his call for secession on the political marginalisation of the Igbo ethnic group, systemic injustice, and entrenched corruption within the political class. An earlier attempt by the Igbo to create an independent country of their own out of Nigeria triggered fierce opposition from the state, culminating in a bloody civil war between 1967 and 1970. Today, the Nigerian government is still strongly determined to protect its sovereignty and has taken a few measures against neo-Biafran secessionism.

This report examines three important measures so far taken by the Nigerian government to metaphorically bring Nnamdi Kanu and the IPOB movement to their knees. It goes on to analyse the implications of the counterinsurgency policies and strategies of the government. It concludes that the policies and strategies of the Nigerian government are poorly formulated, yielding counterproductive results—in an attempt to defeat Kanu, the government has ironically made a hero out of him. It recommends strategic restraint on the part of the government as a way to salvage the situation.

Key Actors

  • Nnamdi Kanu: Seen as a freedom fighter by the Igbo people and a terrorist by the government, Kanu aims to achieve independence for Biafra. He established the IPOB movement in 2014 and used his Radio Biafra, a London-based radio station, to spread his separatist ideology, mobilise support for the grand Biafran cause, and legitimise himself. Around December 2020, the Eastern Security Network (ESN), the paramilitary wing of the IPOB movement, was established to protect the Igbo people and Biafran supporters against any violence by either state or non-state actors.

  • The Federal Government: The Federal Government of Nigeria, under President Muhammadu Buhari and incumbent President Bola Ahmed Tinubu, strives to preserve the country’s sovereignty. It exercises every power available to ensure that the duty is carried out, including crushing any separatist leader or group.

  • The Security Agencies: Attacks on and key arrests of IPOB leaders and supporters are mostly carried out by the army and the Department of State Service (DSS), Nigeria’s secret police. They act on behalf of the state.

  • The Judiciary: It plays a central role in the legal battle between Kanu and the Federal Government. Since 2015, the judiciary has handled Kanu’s case, pronouncing several judgments at different times. Central to the issue it handles is whether or not Kanu is a terrorist, as the Federal Government maintains.

Map of the secesstionist state of Biafra. Source: https://www.economist.com/middle-east-and-africa/2015/11/26/go-your-own-way

1967-70: When Misery was in the Air and Skeletons Lined the Streets

To fully grasp the topic at hand, it is important to briefly explore the historical roots of the Biafran secessionist struggle and the government’s pushback against it. In the early years of Nigeria’s political independence, the people of old Eastern Nigeria, failing to reach a modus vivendi with the Nigerian Military Government led by General Yakubu Gowon, proclaimed their separation from the country and established the Republic of Biafra. That slap to Nigeria’s sovereignty triggered the rapid disintegration into a civil war. 

Between 1967 and 1970, the brutal conflict raged, resulting in an estimated three million casualties. Although the war ended in three years, and in the Biafrans’ defeat, they never gave up their dreams. The Biafran idea lives on. The IPOB movement has served as the lifeline of the secessionist idea in recent times.

Death of the Belgian mercenary Marc Goosens, war of secession Biafra, Nigeria, November 1968. Source: https://contact.photoshelter.com/image/I0000eZ41e_5XR.k

IPOB: The Perceived Hope of the East

The break in the clamour for secession that followed the end of the civil war was significantly interrupted by Nnamdi Kanu's establishment of the IPOB movement in 2014. An eloquent and charismatic young man, Kanu promises to make the defunct Republic of Biafra stand on its feet again.

Master of persuasion, Kanu appeals to the emotions of the public, constantly referencing the plights and suffering of the people of Eastern Nigeria during the civil war and the corrupt practices of the Nigerian political class. He frames Nigeria as a lawless, hopeless and irredeemable nation, always calling it a ‘Zoo’ republicone that the Biafrans and the Biafran apologists must separate from. In 2018, he resorted to conspiracy theory and defamation: he told the public that Nigerian President Muhammadu Buhari was dead and that a Sudanese lookalike was secretly brought in to replace him. He called on IPOB members to boycott elections, engage in street demonstrations and sit-at-home protests, and respond with violence when confronted by the Nigerian security forces.

In addition, Kanu moved from country to country, speaking about his ideology. In several meetings and radio broadcasts, he crafted a saviour image of himself and the IPOB movement as the only hope for the East. He lampooned other groups and secessionist leaders within the eastern region of Nigeria, including Ohanaeze Ndigbo (a socio-economic organisation of the Igbo people) and Chief Ralph Uwazuruike. He considers himself a godsend and one mandated to restore the independence of the defunct Republic of Biafra.

How has the Nigerian Government Responded?

The Nigerian government’s response to the IPOB secessionist struggle is grounded in a tripartite framework:

  • Military Crackdown: The government applies force as a countermeasure against the IPOB insurrection. On 14 October 2015, for example, the Department of State Service (DSS) arrested Nnamdi Kanu in Lagos upon his entry into the country from his base in the UK. For about two years, he was detained despite court orders for his release. He was only granted bail in 2017 upon the deterioration of his health. The same year, the military launched an operation codenamed ‘Operation Python Dance’ in eastern Nigeria with the alleged intention to decapitate the IPOB movement and weaken their activities in the region. They reportedly invaded Kanu’s home during the operation, resulting in him disappearing from Nigeria and, consequently, jumping bail. In December 2019, the security forces also reportedly raided and burnt down the home of Kanu’s lawyer in Anambra State, eastern Nigeria. 

In June 2021, the Nigerian government re-arrested Kanu in Kenya with the assistance of Interpol and the Kenyan authorities, and he was subsequently returned to Nigeria’s capital, Abuja, for prosecution. Again, President Buhari released a tweet within the same period highlighting his government’s intention to unleash violence on IPOB supporters.

  • Proscription: The government criminalised IPOB and labelled it a terrorist movement in September 2017. Thus, participation in any of the group’s activities, especially in any part of Nigeria, became a terrorist offence. 

  • Judicial Crackdown: The Federal Government charged Kanu with multiple offences, inter alia, treasonable felony, unlawful possession of arms, and terrorism-related offences.

Why is the Tripartite Response Weak?

  • Wrong Application of Decapitation: As introduced by Audrey Cronin in How Terrorism Ends, decapitation requires a state to capture (arrest) or kill the leader of a terrorist group in order to collapse the group. This strategy proved successful in Japan against Shoko Asahara of Aum Shinrikyō and in Peru against Abimael Guzmán Reynoso of the Shining Path. Given its designation of Kanu as a terrorist, and the perceived effectiveness of leadership decapitation in the contexts above, it is plausible that the Nigerian government adopted this strategy in his case for similar expected outcomes.

However formidable decapitation may be, it is an erroneous approach in the case of Nnamdi Kanu. The IPOB movement is built on a strong ethnonationalist ideology, age-long grievances against the Nigerian government, and deep aspirations for secession. Additionally, the movement has a structured and resilient organisational framework, featuring a vice leader, a viable successor, a standby legal team, grassroots support, and paramilitary personnel. Therefore, the capturing of Kanu as a way to suppress the IPOB movement is a colossal miscalculation because decapitation as a counterterrorism and counter-insurgence strategy cannot work under such conditions. This explains why, instead of the IPOB movement collapsing, especially after the final arrest of its leader in June 2021, the movement grew in strength, as Simon Ekpa, a Finland-based neo-Biafran supporter, quickly emerged as Kanu’s successor. Following the final arrest, there have also been incessant calls by the new leader of the group for boycotts of elections and the introduction of a compulsory sit-at-home exercise every Monday in the Eastern part of Nigeria—a solidarity action aimed at compelling the government to release Kanu. 

  • Subversion of Democracy and the Rule of Law: A fundamental principle of democracy and the rule of law is respect for human rights. Next to that is the supremacy of the law and the principle of proportionality in law enforcement. While the government's decision to prosecute Kanu in court is procedurally sound and legally justified, its refusal to comply with court orders raises questions about its commitment to democratic principles and the rule of law. Again, Kanu’s extrajudicial detention between 2015 and 2017, his controversial re-arrest in 2021, and recent allegations of political interference in the judicial process concerning his case risk reinforcing the narrative he promotes—one that portrays Nigeria as a ‘zoo’ where the rule of law and respect for human rights are frequently undermined.

  • Labelling Effect: Sociologists believe that when someone or a group is given a negative label, they may, at a point, begin to act in that manner, hence the labelling effect. It often goes hand-in-hand with defensive identity formation (DIF), which involves people/groups pushing back for being called what they think they are not. The labelling of IPOB as a terrorist group was too quick and poorly considered, resulting in a labelling effect and DIF. The surge in violence by the Eastern Security Network (ESN), the paramilitary wing of the IPOB movement, can best be described as DIF—the group is fighting back due to, probably, the negative label.

  • Streisand Effect: This phenomenon is borrowed from the Barbra Streisand case, where Barbra’s (an American entertainer) effort to have a photo of her house removed from the internet unfortunately attracted more attention to it. It happens in political settings. It occurs when a government attempts to suppress a rebellion or movement, but the effort puts the leader in the limelight instead. The worthy examples I found in history are those of Mandela, King, and Gandhi. One common feature underscores the activities of these men—freedom fighters. The arrest, incarceration and persecution of Nelson Mandela by the apartheid regime in South Africa, Martin Luther King Jr. by the American government and Mahatma Gandhi by the British colonial authority in India unexpectedly amplified their struggle and turned them into global icons.

To an appreciable extent, the manner in which the Nigerian government has handled Kanu’s case has resulted in the Streisand effect. Ever since his arrests in 2015 and 2021 (together with the military invasion of his family house in Abia State, the destruction of his lawyer’s home in Anambra State, and the alleged persecution of IPOB supporters in eastern Nigeria), Kanu and the IPOB movement have enjoyed nationwide as well as international attention. For example, essays and stories on the erosion of democracy, violation of human rights, injustice and abuse of power by the Nigerian Government against Nnamdi Kanu and IPOB supporters have appeared in the news and Human Rights Watch’s and Amnesty International’s publications. Kanu’s case has also been raised in the British Parliament, and protests have been organised in his favour across various countries, including Dublin, Republic of Ireland. To add to that, Kanu and the IPOB supporters have exploited their ‘war’ with the Nigerian government to their advantage, strategically positioning themselves as victims of a failed, wicked, unjust and corrupt system. For example, in two separate videos recorded at the Federal High Court Abuja, Kanu claimed that he is oppressed and deprived of justice by the Nigerian government, which has appointed a corrupt judge to his case. On 10 February 2025, in a video, he said, ‘There are things that are happening in this country that a lot of you do not know... Justice Binta Nyako [the presiding judge] is using her position for personal gain. Her son and her husband are facing corruption charges, and they told them that if they convict me... They sent her to my case so they can release or smooth the pathway for the husband and the son... There is a breach of judicial oath; they have violated the judicial oath. They have shown bias, according to the Supreme Court. They are biased against me.’

Policy Recommendation and Conclusion

To give the government an edge in Kanu’s case, or better put, to restore its credibility in handling the case and enhance its strategy, it must subscribe wholly to strategic moderation and restraint. It falls within the framework of ethical politics. As explained earlier, the tripartite response is too harsh and jeopardises peace.  It is a moral imperative for the government to regulate its actions because the application of excessive force in any matter involving freedom fighters turns them into heroes overnight (as it is turning Nnamdi Kanu already), producing counterproductive results. Property destruction should cease, individual rights must be respected, the court must be allowed to adjudicate the case impartially, and judicial orders should be upheld. Authoritarian measures should never be used to make a point in a democratic society.

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