Türkiye's Response to Israel-Iran War?
June 28, 2025 - Written by Ozan A. Koyas
The Event
June 13, 2025 marks a seismic escalation between Israel and Iran. Israel’s “Operation Rising Lion” significantly weakened Iranian power in the Middle East. The operation required the coordination of 200 aircraft striking alongside covert Mossad operations; successfully striking key Iranian nuclear facilities mainly in the Northeast, assassinating nuclear scientists and 30 Iranian Generals.
Israel appears intent on regime change in Iran. This can be seen by the targeting of the Iranian security apparatus, with Israel trying to destabilise the Iranian leadership’s hold on power. Further, Israel has also targeted other key sectors in Iranian oil and gas, key government and civilian infrastructure in cities from Tehran to Mashhad, along with influence and blackmail campaigns against Iranian government officials and the general public, as an additional means to weaken the government and bring about its collapse.
The Iranian response to the initial strikes has not been as effective as Israel’s. While Israel is trying to hide the effects of Iranian missiles on its territory, Iran has not been able to withstand significant Israeli bombardment of its nuclear systems, military departments and facilities. While hundreds of drones and ballistic missiles have been deployed (with some breaching the Israeli Iron Dome missile defence system), Iran has certainly been unable to damage Israel’s military capabilities to the same extent.
However, Iran’s diplomatic statements in Istanbul as well as recent strikes against a US base in Qatar does indicate that Iran has the commitment and the capability to still damage Israeli territory and return fire on US sites. Particularly since the cost of Israel repelling Iranian missiles greatly outweighs the cost of Iran firing them. Moreover, while Iranian missiles may not have appeared to affect Israeli military efforts significantly, they have caused Israel to be dangerously low on missile interceptors that need to be replenished, likely by the US, and the missiles that did hit targets in Israel have caused an estimated $3 billion in damages.
The aftermath of the US strikes and Iran’s retaliation strikes in Qatar although might indicate further escalation, this war has already incurred significant costs for both Iran and Israel. Iran’s strike in Qatar could be a sign of potential strategic weakness, since it targeted a strongly defended US base with lower missile targeting ability. Meanwhile, it could also be an indication that Iran is wanting to end the series of tit-for-tat missile launches and cease escalation, for multiple reasons. Firstly, the US base was fully evacuated a week in advance of Iran’s missile launch, practically ending the chance of any US casualties. Secondly, Iran gave prior notice to the missile launch, reminiscent of the previous missile attack on US facilities in the Middle East in 2020, in response to the US assaination of Gen. Qassem Soleimani, commander of Iran’s Quds Force. This missile attack, therefore, could also be considered Iran trying to ‘save face’.
According to some US intelligence assessments, Iran’s nuclear programme has not been destroyed but rather pushed back by a couple months - this assessment however is deemed wrong by the White House, claiming the comments were leaked by someone with a political agenda. However, the likelihood is Iran’s uranium enrichment progress, despite the disputed effectiveness of the damage by US strikes, has been greatly disrupted and stalled. Offering the US more negotiation power when new talks ensue. However, when this might be is hard to tell as Iranian Foreign Minister, Abbas Araghchi, recently ruled out any talks with the US citing serious damage to nuclear facilities.
Context
This escalation has been developing for some time, particularly since the weakening of Iran’s proxies from Hamas to groups in Syria and the previous exchanges of missiles. The Israel-Gaza war resulted in Israel mostly defeating Iranian proxy groups such as Hezbollah and significantly weakening Hamas, and regime change in Syria, giving the opportunity for Israel to prepare for a larger strike against Iran.
The current Israeli administration led by Netanyahu also has an incentive to continue targeting external threats in the region to hold onto domestic political power. The previous missile exchanges in April and October 2024 among many other skirmishes have also been another factor which has contributed to the increased escalation of the Israeli-Iran conflict.
To illustrate please refer to the timeline below:
Apr 13–14, 2024 – “Operation True Promise”: Iran retaliated for an Israeli strike in Damascus on the Iranian Embassy (which killed an IRGC general) by firing over 120 ballistic missiles, ~170 armed drones and 30+ cruise missiles at Israel. Explosions were heard across Israel (Tel Aviv, Jerusalem, Negev) and 720+ warning sirens sounded.
Oct 1 & 26, 2024 – “Operation True Promise 2”: a night-long salvo of ~200 ballistic missiles at Israel. Israel responded days later (Oct 26) with its biggest-ever strike on Iranian territory, using 100+ aircraft to hit nuclear and defense sites (flying via Syria and Iraq). This was framed as punishment for Iran’s missile barrage.
June 13–21, 2025 - “Rising Lion” Campaign: On June 13, Israel abruptly attacked multiple Iranian sites (nuclear centrifuge plants in Isfahan, missile bases in Kermanshah/Tabriz) in “Operation Rising Lion”, reportedly killing IRGC Chief Salami and other commanders. Within hours Iran hit back: night and day missile/drone volleys (150+ ballistic missiles on June 13 alone) targeted Israeli military and cities.
June 13- 2025 - “Operation Narnia”: This covert operation was enacted by Israel alongside “Rising Lion” and aims to decapitate Iran’s nuclear capabilities and military leadership by assassinating Iranian nuclear scientists and senior military figures, a total of 30 generals killed, in hopes of toppling the Iranian government, military, majorly damaging Iran’s nuclear capacity. It appears to be ongoing, despite the ceasefire.
June 21, 2025 - “Operation Midnight Hammer”: The US launched a substantial attack on Iran’s nuclear infrastructure, launching 24 Tomahawk cruise missiles, using B-2 bombers to deploy 14 GBU-57 Massive Ordinance Penetrators (MOPs), or, ‘bunker-buster’ bombs.
June 22, 2025 - “Operation True Promise 3”: This operation came just hours after the US’s “Operation Midnight Hammer”. Iran continues its direct assault on Israel with over 20 waves of AI-guided missiles and drones targeting military, infrastructure, and tech hubs. Even using, for the first time, the third-generation Kheibar Shekan ballistic missile. Key sites hit include Tel Aviv, Haifa, and strategic air bases. Israel’s defenses intercept many, but significant damage and casualties are reported. Iran warns of further escalation.
June 23, 2025 - “Operation Annunciation of Victory”: This military operation was directed at Al-Udeid Air Base, the largest US military base in the Middle East based in Qatar. The assault was in response to “Operation Midnight Hammer”. Over 12 missiles were fired and Tehran assured Doha that this attack was conducted away from residential areas and does not pose any threat to Qatar, but rather specifically targeted US military infrastructure.
Türkiye’s role
Amid this, Türkiye has adopted diplomacy to call for de-escalation and regional dialogue. However, behind the scenes, Ankara is leveraging the crisis to advance its long-standing ambition of regional power projection, delicately balancing ideological support for Palestine with strategic distrust of Tehran. Since the Israeli strikes, Iranian retaliation, and US involvement, Türkiye has not directly condemned the US’s attack on key Iranian nuclear sites, indicating that Ankara is attempting to remain on favourable terms with the Trump administration and be a partner in the Middle East that can facilitate dialogue, and hopefully peace. In the process granting Ankara a greater standing in the mediation space, aiding its power projection.
Mediation Role
Türkiye sees itself from a historical standpoint as a regional power, which leads it to expanding its influence regardless of whether they are aligned to the ‘West’ or not, this can be seen from attempts to lead a ceasefire and diplomatic talks from the conflict in Ukraine (maintaining cordial relations with both Russia and Ukraine), to Central Asia, and to the Horn of Africa. This foreign policy extends to trying to arrange negotiations between Israel and Iran.
Due to the current state of Turkish foreign policy standing as a go-between for the “West” and what some might refer to as the “anti-liberal order” led by Russia and China, it makes it an ideal country for negotiations to be had and deals to be signed. Under the current circumstances, there is a likely chance that diplomacy may prevail between Israel and Iran, especially since both sides (although not exactly proportionally) have incurred significant costs since the start of the war and further war will greatly damage both nations' economies.
It is however unlikely that any ceasefire deal is to be signed in Türkiye for that matter as Erdoğan has referred to Israel’s attack on Iran as an act of “state terrorism” during the NATO summit and wider Turkish public opinion is on average siding against Israel and in support for the Palestinian cause, including backing Iran against Israel, signalling to Israel that Ankara, as well as the wider domestic population, still continues a very critical view of Israel.
Therefore making Türkiye not the ideal location or vessel for any ceasefire talks to be discussed as Ankara will be deemed a biased mediator and not acting in good faith. Moreover, Israel is increasingly looking at Ankara as a regional adversary and they could be leveraging talks for their own interests. Once again, limiting the possibility of Ankara mediated peace.
Projection of Turkish Interests
Türkiye’s first priority is to project its own interests throughout the region. Currently, Türkiye mainly orients its rhetoric and foreign policy against the current Israeli administration. Since October 7th, Türkiye has cut almost all the trade ties and diplomatic ties with Tel-Aviv. Such a move is a significant policy shift, as prior to October 7th there were normalisation moves in Ankara towards Israel - with close political and military Azerbaijan lobbying Türkiye for normalisation with Israel. From 2024 to the present, however, Erdoğan and his administration have been publicly extremely critical towards Israel, with Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu, along with others in the Israeli government, seeing Türkiye as one of Tel-Aviv’s major security threats. These tensions play out most notably across Syria, where Israel and Türkiye are at loggerheads to secure spheres of influence and control under the new fragile Syrian leadership.
However, simultaneously, Ankara has not completely cut ties with Israel and was one of a select few nations informed by the US about “Operation Midnight Hammer” beforehand. Furthermore, Ankara is still a vital member of NATO and beginning to play an increased role in the European defence infrastructure. These factors could be enough for some form of dialogues and ways to peace be mediated by Türkiye. However, Erdoğan may not wish to appear to be aiding the Israelis in any way shape or form, even through open dialogue with Tel-Aviv for peace, as to not give the impression to his supporter base that he is pandering to US, and in turn, Israeli, pressure.
However, Türkiye’s security ambitions in Syria will become a new source of discord between Tel-Aviv and Ankara, and greatly challenge this complex bilateral relationship. As the Iranian threat within Syria has subsided, benefitting both Israel and Türkiye, Ankara wants to strengthen its hand in the war-torn state and put an end to Kurdish militants and other militant groups, to prevent them gaining support from other players such as Tel-Aviv to disrupt Turkish power and influence in Syria.
While evident tensions do exist between both states, Ankara and Tel-Aviv have not completely cut ties. For example, Azerbaijani oil still flows through Turkey and is exported to Israel from Türkiye’s Ceyhan port, despite Ankara’s trade embargo on Israel and claims that this flow of oil has halted. This does suggest that Türkiye’s foreign policy in the region cannot be categorised as purely one of an ‘anti-Israel’ posturing, no matter how many statements are made to to suggest otherwise with fervent and wholehearted support for Palestine, there is always the strategy behind the scenes being played out. Ankara, is a state that for the past decade has pursued a foreign policy of strategic autonomy.
Complex Bilateral Relationship with Iran
The last and important point: Türkiye is not a direct ally with Iran despite having a loosely similar posturing towards Israel. The two states do have cordial diplomatic relations, often with Iranian representatives joining conferences in Istanbul (as well as other parts of the country), Türkiye being Iran’s largest trading partner, and Iranians spending billions of US dollars on properties and investments in Türkiye to protect their money from intensified sanctions and inflation. Yet, under the diplomacy space, Türkiye and Iran do stand on different sides of many geopolitical battles in the region and beyond. Afterall, the recent regime change in Syria led by the HTS interim government was a major victory for Türkiye at the cost of Iran, who had gained influence in the Levant through the Assad regime.
Aside from Syria, Türkiye and Iran have often engaged in opposite sides of proxy wars in the South Caucasus and North Africa, such as in Libya. The reason behind their opposition may have to do with power competition over influencing Middle Eastern affairs, either under Turkish or Iranian matters. Additionally, Türkiye and Iran have historically, from the Ottomans and the Safavids, been at loggerheads for regional influence and power. This power competition is hardly anything new.
There are many variables that dictate their power competition. One, Iran and Türkiye do stand on different sects of Islam, Shia and Sunni respectively. This divide has fuelled the support for different proxy groups in conflicts in the region. Second, Türkiye may want to stand as an in-between the two world orders but as of now, it is still a key force in expanding NATO interests in the Levant and the Caucasus. While Türkiye may not be as strong of an enemy as the US is to Iran, it still stands as an alternative leader to direct Middle East affairs.
Thus, Türkiye may be waiting to see how the Israeli-Iranian conflict unfolds and step in to fill the power gap that Iran is leaving behind - as occurred in Syria. While Türkiye is most unlikely to attack Israel like Iran, it is certainly preparing to take advantage of the current military losses of Iran. One possible example of how this dynamic may play out in the South Caucasus. Iran’s weakening stature in the region could favour Turkish ambitions to lead peace negotiations between Armenia and Azerbaijan.
Armenia has already made a historic commitment in meeting Turkish President Erdoğan on June 20th, a day after Azerbaijani President Ilham Aliyev held talks with Erdoğan. Iran’s attention being focused largely on Israel has potentially left Armenia, an ally, particularly since the Second Karabakh War, on the sidelines. Iran, was a primary guarantor to Armenia against further Turkish and Azeri encirclement in the aftermath of the war but also a key trade and military partner. Iran had the incentives to continue its support since it was a way to counter Azeri influence in its Northwest Territories and combat Azeri ties with Israel.
Unfortunately for Armenia, Iran has pulled back and is no longer committing to the nation as it once did. So, as Iran weakens, normalisation efforts between Yerevan, Ankara, and Baku could ensue and a trilateral relationship form. With Armenian isolation due to a weakened Iran, we could see Yerevan being more susceptible to Baku’s terms for peace, which involves changing the Armenian constitution to remove claims to contested territory. Further, Iran is cautious of the Trans-Caspian International Transport Route (TITR), otherwise known as the ‘Middle Corridor’, a trade route from China to Europe, put particularly the Zangezur Corridor part of the project (that goes connects Azerbaijan to Türkiye, linking Nakhchivan Autonomous Region, a western exclave of Azerbaijan separated from the rest of the country by Armenian territory) This trade route would cut across Iran’s border with Armenia, increase Turkish presence near its borders, greatly expand Turkish influence. Tehran has referred to this project as “Turkey’s highway to Turan”.
Increasing Military Defence and Offensive Capabilities
The Turkish military has been modernising with a number of domestically produced equipment including unmanned drones such as the infamous Bayraktar TB2 and the popular unmanned combat aerial vehicle the Bayraktar Kızılelma, fourth generation battle tanks such as the Altay, and short-range ballistic missile systems such as the Tayfun.
Turkey’s doctrine is further shifting to a multi-domain force, integrating drones, EW, AI, armour, and air alert systems for layered battle space dominance. Although the Turkish military remains technologically behind in terms of air defence systems, it has recently increased its military development as a deterrence against Israeli aggression. This move is also confirmed by previous diplomatic and official statements by Erdoğan to project Turkish military influence against Israel, but also against other militant groups in Syria and Iraq. Additionally, part of Türkiye's mediation role is this increased military presence, as it can allow Türkiye a place as a guarantor in any ceasefire or conflict resolution scenario in the region.
Conclusion
Turkey is using a two-pronged strategy of diplomacy and subtle military development as reactions to the Israeli-Iranian conflict. It is likely that Türkiye will avoid entering into the regional war as it waits to see how the Iranian government will recover or collapse - with the latter also presenting larger issues as this can lead to a potential refugee crisis that Ankara wants to avoid and has already made statements suggesting closing the open-door policy for potential Iranian refugees.