Türkiye to Re-join the F-35 Program?
November 01, 2025 - Written by Ozan A. Koyas
Türkiye's potential re-entry into the F-35 Joint Strike Fighter program hinges on overcoming the foundational impasse created by its acquisition of the Russian S-400 air defence system. While there may be more recent hope that Türkiye could re-join the program, as hinted by Trump during the Washington meeting with Erdoğan in late September, Türkiye must leverage its position in Ukraine as well as its mineral deposit attributes to potentially convince the US; this result could be difficult to achieve as it hinges on Türkiye altering its decades-long 360-degree foreign policy. Nevertheless, there is definitely interest from Ankara to still have these Western fighter jets to remain ahead of regional rivals like Israel and train its engineers to develop Turkish equivalents. It is still unlikely that Türkiye would be allowed to re-join the F-35 program as long as the Russo-Ukrainian war continues and the 360-degree foreign policy prevents Türkiye from making concessions at the expense of its non-Western partners.
The core impediment to Türkiye re-joining the F-35 program is the S-400's unacceptable technical risk to the F-35's stealth capabilities. Since the S-400 Russian missiles scanners could be in theory used to gather intelligence on American jet fighter capabilities, it could prove to be a security threat that hinders NATO’s air deterrence capabilities. Consequently, this concern prompted Washington to enact binding legislation—notably Section 1245 of the FY2020 National Defence Authorization Act (NDAA)—prohibiting the transfer. This law, which lacks a presidential waiver, creates a legislative firewall that diplomatic overtures such as Türkiye cutting off Russian oil and gas alone cannot breach. The Countering America's Adversaries Through Sanctions Act (CAATSA) does technically offer a presidential waiver which Trump has considered using for F-35A variant models. While doing away with sanctions through legal calculations could allow a key NATO ally to better coordinate militarily with other NATO members in the region, as long as Türkiye possesses S-400 missiles, the security threat for F-35 is not mitigated. There could potentially be two alternative avenues which might be more convincing to a more transactional US President.
Analysis of the Ukraine and Mineral Avenues
Continuing Turkish diplomatic attempts to broker a ceasefire could possibly influence the US to consider lifting off sanctions. Ankara has signalled its readiness to act as a security guarantor for Ukraine as part of a final peace agreement, a major commitment that few nations are equipped to undertake. This offer aligns with a potential Trump administration's desire for a swift diplomatic resolution to the conflict. President Trump has publicly praised President Erdoğan as a vital and powerful mediator, highlighting his unique ability to engage with both Moscow and Kyiv. This dynamic mirrors the recent brokerage of the Gaza ceasefire, where Trump turned to Erdoğan to leverage his influence with Hamas and secure an agreement after 7 months of impasse. There is a possibility that if Türkiye were to play a similar role in Ukraine, Trump could be persuaded to give F-35s as a reward. However, the continued staunch diplomatic divide between Ukraine and Russia makes that concession possibility a very unlikely chance in the short and medium term. Turkish diplomatic efforts have failed 3 times already due to this reality.
Additionally, Türkiye is unlikely to give up its purchasing of Russian oil and gas in time to quickly regain access to F-35s, which Trump offered Erdoğan as a possibility. Türkiye's refusal to sever energy ties with Russia is rooted in deep-seated strategic and economic imperatives. Ankara remains highly dependent on Moscow for its energy needs, with Russia supplying roughly 40% of its natural gas. For an economy already grappling with high inflation, abruptly cutting off this supply would be devastating and is considered a non-starter. This dependency is not just economic; it is a core component of Ankara's transactional foreign policy, which seeks to balance its relationships with both the West and Russia to maximise its own strategic autonomy. While Türkiye is actively diversifying its energy sources to be less dependent on Russia by 2028, notably through long-term LNG deals with the U.S., Russian gas remains a competitively priced and essential part of its energy mix. Therefore, despite pressure from Washington, a complete halt to Russian energy imports is not a viable short-term option for Türkiye to get on back to the F-35 program in the short to medium term.
A more potent bargaining chip for Ankara has emerged from its significant mineral wealth. Recent developments in 2025 have amplified this leverage, creating a direct and urgent alignment of strategic interests with the United States that could reshape the F-35 debate. Türkiye has long been a major producer of industrial minerals like boron and chromium, useful in several military applications for vehicle armour and rocket engines. While the discovery and the possible future processing of rare earth element (REE) deposit centres such as the Beylikova site can further Türkiye’s positioning in the minerals market, the recoverable rare earth oxide (REO) content is estimated at a still-significant 12.5 million tons; this pales in comparison to figures by China and Vietnam. Nevertheless, Türkiye could still be attractive for the US as part of its broader strategy to decouple its minerals' dependency from China, with Türkiye playing a small but still important role in aiding US’s mission. The Beylikova deposit contains 10 of the 17 REEs, including strategically vital "magnet metals" like neodymium and praseodymium, which are indispensable for high-tech defence systems, electric vehicles, and wind turbines.
With these attributes, Washington could be likely to show interest in Türkiye. In August 2025, the U.S. Geological Survey released a draft update of its Critical Minerals List, using a new methodology to quantify the economic risks of supply chain disruptions. This has been followed by a flurry of activity to build a network of allied suppliers, including a major framework agreement with Australia and a $1.8 billion joint investment consortium with the UAE, both announced in October 2025. Türkiye is now perfectly positioned to join this network. Advanced talks with the U.S. began in late 2025 after earlier negotiations with China and Russia faltered. Beijing and Moscow reportedly refused to transfer the critical midstream processing technology. In contrast, Türkiye's key demand in talks with the U.S. is the establishment of a complete domestic value chain, from mining to local refining and technology transfer, which directly aligns with Washington's goal of building secure, non-Chinese processing capacity.
Outlooks for Rejoining the F-35 Program
Reinstatement is contingent on the permanent and verifiable removal of the S-400 threat. Superficial workarounds like rendering the system "inoperable" are non-starters due to their reversible nature and the dangerous precedent they would set.
A plausible, though challenging, path forward involves a grand bargain:
A Permanent S-400 Solution: Türkiye agrees to a verifiable relocation of its S-400s, with the "Nakhchivan Solution" being the most credible option. This would physically remove the system from Turkish territory, satisfying U.S. law.
F-35 Reinstatement and Sanctions Relief: The U.S. certifies to Congress that NDAA conditions have been met and uses its waiver authority to lift CAATSA sanctions.
A Strategic Minerals Partnership: The deal is cemented by a formal U.S.-Türkiye partnership to develop the Beylikova REE deposit, including U.S. investment and technology transfer.
This framework offers major strategic victories for both sides, allowing Ankara to reclaim its airpower ambitions and Washington to secure a critical supply chain while resolving a major rift within NATO.
Regardless of the outcome, the S-400 affair has inflicted lasting damage on the trust between Washington and Ankara. The relationship is likely to remain highly transactional, driven by pragmatic bargaining rather than a shared strategic alignment. Failure to resolve the issue will accelerate Türkiye's strategic drift, forcing it to rely on its indigenous KAAN fighter and European alternatives like the Eurofighter Typhoon. This would further decouple its defence architecture from NATO standards and deepen the fissure within the alliance. The F-35 saga has become a defining test of NATO's ability to manage internal fractures, and its resolution—or lack thereof—will have lasting implications for the alliance's cohesion in the Eastern Mediterranean and Black Sea.
Written by Ozan A. Koyas
Analyst on the Türkiye Research Desk