The United States Lifts Sanctions on Syria After Almost Five Decades
June 03, 2025 - Written by Ethan Joyce
Introduction
A couple of weeks ago, President Donald Trump announced plans to lift nearly five decades of sanctions on Syria. This development, first unveiled at a U.S.-Saudi Investment Forum on 12 May 2025, alongside Crown Prince Mohammed Bin Salman, represents a substantial departure from established U.S. foreign policy. The announcement follows the December 2024 ousting of Bashar al-Assad and the establishment of a transitional government led by Ahmed al-Sharaa and Hay'at Tahrir al-Sham (HTS), a former al-Qaeda affiliate. In light of these developments, critical questions arise about Syria's evolving sociopolitical and economic landscape under new leadership, accompanying promised alterations to U.S. foreign policy.
Contextual Analysis
The United States first imposed sanctions on Syria in 1979, designating the country as a State Sponsor of Terrorism (SST). This initial action established a framework that would expand over subsequent decades, with the most substantial expansions following the outbreak of the civil war in 2011. Consecutive U.S. administrations implemented increasingly comprehensive restrictions targeting the Assad regime for war crimes, human rights violations, and the systematic oppression of various ethnic groups.
The political landscape in Syria shifted dramatically in December 2024 when Ahmed al-Sharaa, heading HTS, spearheaded an offensive that culminated in Bashar al-Assad fleeing the country. This effectively ended the civil war and created the conditions to establish a transitional government under Sharaa's leadership. Since assuming power, Syria's government has demonstrated to the international community that ongoing sanctions largely imposed during Assad's rule would impede development efforts and cause further instability in the country.
Core Analysis
Speaking in Riyadh, Trump declared that lifting sanctions would give Syria "a chance at greatness," noting that economic restrictions had left the war-torn country crippled. Shortly after his announcement, Trump met and shook hands with Sharaa, who has only recently been removed from the U.S. "Specially Designated Global Terrorist" list and whose organisation HTS is still categorised as a Foreign Terrorist Organization (FTO) according to the State Department website. The meeting marked the beginning of efforts to normalise relations, seeing as this is the first time a Syrian president and a US president have met in 25 years.
On 23 May, the Trump administration took its first concrete steps toward sanctions relief. The U.S. Department of the Treasury announced sanctions remissions for various individuals and entities under General License 25, stating the measures would enable foreign direct investment and increased private sector activity. Concurrently, the State Department issued a 180-day waiver to the Caesar Syria Civilian Protection Act. In 2019, Trump signed the Caesar Syria Civilian Protection Act into law. This legislation imposed sweeping economic and travel sanctions and granted the president broad authority to declare secondary sanctions on third parties for their role in maintaining the Assad regime, namely proxies of Iran and Russia. The act specifically authorised sanctions against foreign companies conducting transactions with the Syrian government, military, and banking institutions, creating a comprehensive web of restrictions that isolated Syria from the global economy. These sanctions, while temporarily on hold, require an act of Congress to entirely repeal.
Despite these initial steps, Trump's commitment to removing sanctions in their entirety faces significant legal and political challenges. There are also some confusing signals coming out of the White House. Paradoxically, just one week prior to his announcement at the investment forum, Trump notified Congress that the national emergency concerning Syria first declared under President Bush through Executive Order 13338 in 2004, would continue beyond May of 2025. This extension was justified by Syria's ongoing issues relating to chemical weapons and Islamic State terrorism, which continue to pose threats to U.S. national security in spite of the General License issuance.
Key Players and Stakeholders
Türkiye: In recent years, Türkiye had been attempting to normalise relations with the Assad regime, while Sharaa's HTS was organising out of northern Syria. The HTS-Ankara relationship is much stronger now than a decade ago during the civil war's beginnings, largely due to the fact that Assad refused to negotiate with President Erdogan. This change in politics is a direct result of the Turkish political desire to return Syrian refugees to Syria and reduce the influence of Kurds and the Kurdish Workers Party domestically. In November of 2024, Turkish-backed groups in the Syrian National Army participated in the opposition offensive by HTS. Today, Türkiye looks to have a large influence in nation-building, even if its diplomatic efforts are recognised primarily as a tool to advance their own national interests; as of February 20, Turkish officials and NGOs had met with the transitional government in Damascus 93 times. Sharaa and Erdogan had another high-profile visit a few days ago.
Saudi Arabia and Qatar: Qatar and Saudi Arabia have both played crucial roles in Syria's political upheaval, though with different priorities. While Qatar aligns with political Islam, Saudi Arabia has taken a comparatively more cautious approach (especially in the wake of the Qatar diplomatic crisis), prioritising the containment of Iranian influence, limiting the influence of jihadist groups, and lobbying for Syria's reintegration into the Arab world.
Israel: Israel views the new Syrian administration with hostility, regardless of its democratisation signals. Israeli concerns over chemical weapons storage, Hezbollah activity, and the possibility of Syrian attacks have led to continued airstrikes and the seizure of Mount Hermon in late December of last year. Israel was also reportedly blindsided by U.S. rapprochement with Sharaa and has warned against legitimising the new regime. Trump's unpredictable stances have led to a growing disconnect between U.S. and Israeli positions, which will likely present points of contention in the future as Israel and Syria are in direct talks focused on security matters. In spite of encouraging diplomatic signs, recent Israeli airstrikes targeting sites in western Syria could spark further conflict, especially between Türkiye and Israel. Israeli leaders are increasingly worried that Türkiye’s ambitions in Syria extend beyond its borders and into Israel itself. Israel should carefully weigh its security outlook, ensuring channels for diplomatic engagement with Ankara are maintained in order to prevent region wide conflict from breaking out.
Iran: The collapse of Assad's regime largely dismantled Tehran's arms supply corridor to Hezbollah, weakening its axis of resistance. After years of investment, including Hezbollah deployments in Syria, Iran is without a strong proxy in Damascus. These setbacks were compounded during late 2023, when Iranian-backed forces clashed with Israel, draining their military capital. New groups like the Islamic Resistance Front were formed in response to the government inaction in relation to Israeli military action in the Golan Heights, and are alleged to have Iranian support. Should sectarian tensions or rival powers like Iran gain ground during a resurgence, Syria's stability will be threatened, complicating efforts to rebuild critical infrastructure and provide necessary humanitarian assistance.
Russia: President Putin has been forced to scale back his regional ambitions and commit to a large-scale withdrawal of troops from the country. This action exposed the vulnerability of Russia's outposts in Syria, especially with its military stretched thin due to the ongoing war in Ukraine. In an interview in April, Sharaa said that during diplomatic negotiations between Syria and Russia, Syrian officials requested Russia to extradite Assad as a condition for allowing their continued military presence in Syria. Russia refused this request and has continued to station some troops in naval and air bases in Tartus. It appears diplomatic relations have continued and rulers in Damascus have maintained ties with Moscow, although spheres of influence are actively transforming.
Syria's Transitional Government: The safety of certain ethnic groups and refugee populations remains at risk during this uncertain period. Additionally, the government has the herculean task of managing international expectations and sanctions pressures while simultaneously consolidating power at home. This will be especially challenging in the realm of Israeli relations: Western nations imposing sanctions would like for there to be reconciliation, meanwhile domestic political groups stand in opposition to the normalisation of relations as a result of the Israeli bombing campaign which has persisted post-Assad. It is still yet to be seen whether or not Sharaa will be able to properly facilitate democratic elections too, although many remain optimistic.
Military, Economic, and Social Dimensions
Economic: The sanctions which intended to pressure the Assad government, contributed to severe economic uncertainty in Syria, pushing the poverty rate to 90% and triggering a mass exodus of Syrians to neighbouring countries, including Türkiye and Lebanon. Paradoxically, these measures facilitated further infrastructural dependency on Russia and Iran, especially for exports, as the government sought alternative economic partnerships to circumnavigate sanctions and to sustain its faltering economy. A 2020 United Nations report estimated that Syria suffered total economic losses of approximately $442.2 billion in the first eight years of the war alone. The immediate economic effects of sanctions relief have been positive, with the Syrian pound experiencing a reported 30% rise in value against the U.S. dollar following Trump's initial announcement (with discrepancies between black market currency exchanges and official exchanges). Qatar and Saudi Arabia's joint settlement of Syria's $15.5 million IMF debt has restored the country's access to vital international loans and grant programs, too. Qatar's pledge of $29 million per month for three months to cover Syrian civil service salaries provides crucial short-term stability, and more recently Syria reached an agreement with Qatar's UCC Holding to develop significant power generation projects to the tune of $7 billion. On 16 May, it was announced that Syria plans to print currency in the United Arab Emirates and Germany, ending the previously Russian role, signalling a broader economic reorientation away from Moscow.
Military: The Islamic State continues to pose a militaristic challenge to government stability, with attacks persisting despite the transitional government's efforts. 19 May marked the first IS attack on the transitional government since December, targeting a security post with a car bomb. There is hope, however, as IS strength continues to wane and attacks against IS cells have continued. Israeli military actions present ongoing security challenges for Sharaa’s government, with continued airstrikes and the seizure of Mount Hermon demonstrating regional tensions. The formation of new groups like the Islamic Resistance Front in response to Israeli actions in the Golan Heights suggests potential for renewed proxy conflicts, also threatening the stability necessary for reconstruction efforts.
Social: According to a 2023 report from the United Nations Human Rights office, an average of 84 civilians were killed every day in direct relation to the civil war in Syria. Sectarian violence has continued, with minority Druze and Alawite communities facing retaliatory killings during this transitional period. The safety of ethnic groups and refugee populations remains precarious, representing a continuing humanitarian crisis that requires careful management and international coordination. It is important to highlight the role of external actors, such as Israel and factions within the Druze community, in intensifying sectarian divides for political advantage. These influences have exacerbated ethnic and religious tensions, contributing to the prolonged instability in the region and undermining the efficacy of Sharaa’s government's ability to rule.
Russian Navy warships off the coast of Tartus Naval Base, Syria, on Dec 10, 2024. Source: https://news.usni.org/2024/12/10/satellite-photos-show-russian-navy-exodus-from-syria-syrian-missile-boats-sunk-at-pier
Opportunities and Risks
Opportunities
Democratic constitution and elections: Establishing a democratic framework can help insulate the country from foreign interference and reduce negative political consequences associated with extremism by promoting inclusive governance.
Violence and Political Instability: Ending sectarian conflict can foster national unity and social cohesion, creating a more secure and stable environment.
Withdrawal of US troops stationed in Syria: The removal of foreign military presence will enhance national sovereignty and reduce tensions with regional powers, while permitting the US to lessen its reach overseas.
Economic stability: Achieving economic stability can attract foreign direct investment stimulating growth and rebuilding critical infrastructure. Having this infrastructure in place also necessitates a comprehensive humanitarian response.
Risks
Congressional Reluctance: The Caesar Syria Civilian Protection Act requires congressional approval for complete repeal, even considering the issuance of waivers like GL 25. It seems improbable that Congress will take swift action relating to sanctions remissions, considering the legacy of previous policy and the general hesitancy to rush remissions expressed by some congresspeople.
Terrorist Designations and Economic Reintegration: HTS remains designated as a Foreign Terrorist Organization (FTO). Providing material support to an FTO carries steep penalties, including fines, imprisonment, asset freezes, and further sanctions, which have been temporarily suspended. The removal of HTS from this list necessitates an act of Congress or a petition by the FTO to the Secretary of State. Since the general license is only temporary and still stands to be revoked if not renewed in six months, private entities may be slow to reintegrate into the economy for fear that their investment will be upended and short-lived.
Legal Ambiguities: The Trump administration must address the conditionality of sanctions outlined in various legislative acts. Some conditions, such as ensuring the dignified return of refugees during repatriation, have indefinite timeframes for facilitation, even though there is no guarantee that waivers will remain in place past their expiration deadline. Additionally, the U.S. government must reach a legal determination on what constitutes "the Government of Syria" for purposes of future judgments should there be infighting, unrest, or other claims to power by sectarian groups. The cessation of sectarian violence and the prevention of future violence is a condition of GL 25. The process for determining what constitutes a revocation of the general license seems unclear, as attacks have continued in recent weeks against Druze and Alawite communities and by terrorist groups like IS.
Policy Recommendations
Establish robust mechanisms to monitor Syria’s adherence to commitments on counterterrorism and regional stability, while expanding humanitarian assistance to alleviate suffering and support Syria’s recovery from prolonged conflict and authoritarian rule.
Collaborate with neighbouring governments to ensure Syrian refugees are properly informed and able to return voluntarily to Syria in a safe and dignified manner.
Enforce Syrian compliance with the mandates of the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW).
Extend waivers under General License 25 with conditionality. There must be measurable progress in governance reforms and human rights protections.
Publicly define increasingly specific benchmarks for Syria’s political transition to guide continued sanctions relief.
Encourage regional dialogue and cooperation to support Syria’s transition and promote long-term stability, while ensuring partners in the reconstruction process do not co-opt initiatives for self-serving gains.
Conclusion
The true test of this diplomatic pivot lies not in immediate economic indicators or temporary political arrangements, but in whether it can break the destructive cycle that has characterised Syrian governance. The international community now faces the delicate challenge of encouraging genuine reform while avoiding the naïve assumption that economic incentives alone can guarantee democratic progress or regional stability.
The success of these initiatives will ultimately depend on Syria's ability to finalise the establishment of a democratic system, protect minority rights, and maintain stability while navigating complex regional dynamics involving stakeholder nations with different political desires. The temporary nature of current sanctions relief underscores the conditional and fragile nature of this diplomatic opening. Moving forward, careful monitoring of Syria's adherence to counterterrorism commitments, human rights protections, and democratic reforms will be essential to determine whether this bold policy shift can deliver lasting peace and prosperity, while humanitarian initiatives ameliorate circumstances on the ground.