Navigating Security Dilemmas in US-Iran Nuclear Negotiations
June 06, 2025 - Written by Aydin Dezfouli
Introduction
Over the past two decades, Iran’s nuclear programme has been a persistent source of concern for the West. While diplomatic efforts led to the establishment of the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) in 2015, shifting geopolitical dynamics have since escalated tensions, turning cautious engagement into overt hostility and placing national security on heightened alert. With President Trump back in office, the current US administration took an unprecedented stance, openly considering direct military action against the Islamic Republic—an approach no previous administration had formally pursued. At present, US Special Envoy to the Middle East, Steve Witkoff, and Iranian Foreign Minister, Abbas Araghchi, remain locked in indirect negotiations, aiming to reach an agreement before President Trump’s deadline of 11 June 2025. As the negotiations progress through a fourth round focused on Iran’s uranium enrichment programme, this report evaluates the potential outcomes of the ongoing talks and the challenges they face. It seeks to analyse the balance between Iran’s pursuit of national security and its economic imperatives, and ultimately, to assess where Tehran stands within this complex strategic dilemma.
Contextual Analysis
Diplomacy
The first round of indirect negotiations between Tehran and Washington took place on 12 April 2025 in Muscat, with Omani officials acting as mediators. The discussions brought together US Special Envoy Steve Witkoff and Iranian Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi, marking a cautious yet significant step towards renewed diplomatic engagement.
Following the initial meeting, the negotiations progressed into a second, third and fourth round. In view of a deadline set by President Donald Trump for 11 June, Tehran extended an invitation to Russia to participate in the second round, held in Rome on 19 April 2025—signalling a deliberate expansion of the diplomatic framework.
Despite longstanding mistrust between the United States and Iran, the talks have resulted in initial commitments. Tehran has agreed to limit its nuclear enrichment programme to 3.67% and to grant United Nations inspectors access to its nuclear facilities. In return, the lifting of economic sanctions and unfreezing of assets has been proposed, along with the restoration of oil and petroleum exports.
The cooperation of the United Kingdom, France, and Germany reinforces the multilateral nature of the negotiations, which bear a strong resemblance to the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action that the Trump administration withdrew from in 2018.
Nuclear Program
According to reports by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), as of March 2025, Iran has significantly expanded its nuclear programme by 16%. The country has converted its stockpile of 60% enriched uranium into a capacity equivalent to 174 weapons-grade uranium (WGU) units, amounting to approximately 25 kilograms of weapons-grade material.
The Institute of Science and International Security estimate that, based on the combined output of the Fordow and Natanz nuclear facilities and the current rate of uranium enrichment, Iran now possesses the capacity to produce up to 17 nuclear weapons. These projections are based on the operational centrifuge capacity and total enriched uranium stockpile currently documented.
However, the situation remains opaque at Isfahan’s facility, where the IAEA has been unable to verify the rate of uranium enrichment or the volume of stockpiles present. This lack of transparency raises further concerns about the full extent of Iran’s nuclear ambitions and the potential for undeclared activities.
Security
Following the end of the Iran-Iraq War (1980–1988), Iran has significantly invested in its defence and security infrastructure. Seeking to expand its regional influence, the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) has established a network of proxy groups across the Middle East, each aligned with Tehran’s strategic interests. Today, the IRGC plays a central role in safeguarding the national security of the Islamic Republic.
Over the past four decades, Iran has developed an extensive network of underground military facilities, housing long-range ballistic and cruise missiles, as well as a growing arsenal of drones capable of striking targets as far as Tel Aviv—an ability demonstrated in April and October 2024. The IRGC Navy remains highly active in the Persian Gulf, employing high-speed attack boats and anti-ship mines, frequently operating in proximity to US naval patrols.
In a recent development, Iran announced the deployment of a new supersonic cruise missile with a reported range of 2,000 kilometres. The Strategic Partnership signed by Tehran and Moscow has brought the two nations closer, with the arms trade linking political and economic agreements. However, Iran’s air defence systems have faced challenges; four Russian-made S-300 missile defence batteries were destroyed by Israeli strikes. In response, Iran has turned to additional Russian hardware, including the subsonic Yak-130 jet trainer and the advanced Su-35 fighter aircraft, acquired from Moscow to reinforce its aerial defence capabilities.
Economy
Iran is currently the most heavily sanctioned country in the world, followed by Russia after it invaded Ukraine in 2022. According to World Bank statistics, the country faces an inflation rate of 40% and a poverty rate of 18.0%, with individuals living on less than $6.85 per day. With a population of 91 million, the unemployment rate stands at 37.7%. Oil production continues to decline as a result of US sanctions, with Iran increasingly reliant on energy exports to China to meet average demand. However, this has resulted US sanctions targeting Chinese companies conducting business with Iran. The energy sector remains inefficient, and shortages of gas and electricity have become a source of widespread public frustration. Meanwhile, technology transfer and infrastructure development are severely constrained by financial limitations.
Challenges
Iran has been pushed into a vulnerable position. President Trump’s 'maximum pressure' campaign escalated into a direct military threat aimed at forcing Tehran to negotiate. Nuclear disarmament was the core objective of the Trump administration. However, given Iran’s vulnerability and the stance of its clerical leadership, US demands risk derailing negotiations in ways that could pose serious challenges to Iran’s defence security.
Restoring Maximum Pressure on Iran by the National Security Presidential Memorandum (NSPM) outlines:
Iran should be denied a nuclear weapon and intercontinental ballistic missiles.
Iran’s terrorist network should be neutralised
Iran’s aggressive development of missiles, as well as other asymmetric and conventional weapons capabilities, should be countered.
Since the events of 7 October, the Islamic Republic has witnessed the dismantling of its allies and proxy networks in Gaza, Lebanon, and Syria. With the Houthis across the Red Sea remaining as its last significant external strategic asset, Iran has increasingly come to rely on its internal security capabilities, something it has long regarded as a 'red line'.
Given the current situation, any of the manifesto protocols of the NSPM could be introduced by Washington as part of the negotiation process. This presents serious implications for Iran’s defence and security.
Key Players
US: Determined to pressure Iran into negotiations, Washington remains firm in its pursuit of nuclear disarmament across the region. Indirect talks have affirmed Iran’s right to enrich uranium for energy and humanitarian purposes. In cooperation with the United Nations and international watchdogs such as the IAEA, both Washington and Tehran are engaged in efforts to revive the initial framework of the JCPOA. While compliance with nuclear negotiations could lead to the lifting of economic sanctions, Iran’s arsenal of military and long-range missiles remains a sensitive issue, raising concerns in both Washington and Tel Aviv. As negotiations continue, the US Treasury has imposed new sanctions on six Chinese companies involved in the supply of chemical components linked to Iran. Since the US withdrawal from the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action and the assassination of General Soleimani in 2020, mistrust between the Islamic Republic and President Trump has reached unprecedented levels.
UK & EU: The United Kingdom, Germany, and France expressed their willingness to align with the United States in lifting sanctions, contingent upon Tehran’s compliance with inspections conducted by United Nations agencies and a demonstrable reduction in uranium enrichment activities. During President Obama’s second term, the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action generated significant interest among European investors in Iran. Key sectors including international banking, Airbus and the motor industry viewed the Iranian market as a promising avenue for economic engagement and long-term commercial opportunities.
Israel: While Benjamin Netanyahu has long advocated in the US Congress for nuclear disarmament and regime change in Iran, Israel remained firmly opposed to the JCPOA. From Israel’s perspective, lifting economic sanctions would empower the Ayatollahs in Tehran by providing them with greater leverage to expand their network of regional proxies, which Israel views as a direct threat to its national security and existence. As Israel continued its military operations in both Gaza and Lebanon, the collapse of the Assad regime in Syria posed a significant setback to Iran’s regional influence through its proxy networks. In response to the prospect of a nuclear-armed Iran, Netanyahu proposed a ‘Libyan-style agreement,’ calling for the complete dismantling of Iran’s nuclear arsenal and stockpiles at all levels.
Russia: Moscow’s position as a mediator during the JCPOA negotiations in 2015 included a strong endorsement of Iran’s right to peaceful nuclear energy. Facilitating diplomatic dialogue between Tehran and the P5+1, Russia even proposed offering technical assistance to help convert Iran’s nuclear facilities into peaceful research centres. The Kremlin described President Trump’s withdrawal from the JCPOA as a unilateral setback, while continuing to maintain economic relations with Tehran. Following the launch of Russia’s military operation in Ukraine in 2022, relations between Moscow and Tehran have grown significantly closer, encompassing not only economic cooperation but also deepening military ties. During the negotiation process, a direct letter from Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei was delivered by Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi to President Putin, reaffirming the Iranian-Russian Comprehensive Strategic Partnership.
Opportunities & Risks
Opportunities:
Successful negotiations resulting in nuclear disarmament would enhance regional security, potentially shifting the balance of power towards greater stability.
According to the World Bank, the lifting of sanctions and the European Union’s oil embargo could lead to a 3.7% increase in Iran’s per capita economic growth. Furthermore, Israel (0.5%), the United States (0.3%), and the European Union (0.5%) are also projected to experience modest per capita welfare gains from increased trade liberalisation with Iran.
Foreign investment, coupled with renewed access to energy markets and trade exports, would provide Iran with the opportunity to reinvest in domestic infrastructure, the energy sector, and financial services, stimulating job creation and supporting overall economic growth.
Risks:
By reducing its uranium enrichment, Iran places itself in a vulnerable security position vis-à-vis hostile states. Tehran is in no position to compete militarily with the United States, and the dismantling of its proxy networks has significantly weakened its external security strategy, particularly with Israel. Washington also acknowledges the potential threat posed by Iran to US interests in the region, aiming to avoid a regional escalation.
Should any elements of the National Security Presidential Memorandum be introduced into the negotiation framework, Iran may find itself forced to choose between economic recovery and national security, effectively limiting its strategic options. Potentially making Tehran act more rashly and further regional instability ensue.
If negotiations succeed and a mutually acceptable agreement is reached, the lifting of economic sanctions and Iran’s reintegration into the global market could significantly impact other oil-producing nations. According to the World Bank, global oil prices could decline by as much as 13% due to Iran re-entering the international oil export market. This development would likely result in a per capita economic loss ranging from 3.9% to 2.7% for other OPEC members, including the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) states and Russia.
Conclusion
President Trump adopted a markedly more radical approach compared to previous US administrations, presenting the possibility of direct military action as a means of coercing Iran into negotiations. Although bilateral diplomatic negotiations are ongoing, Iran now finds
itself at a critical crossroads between national security and economic survival. With limited strategic options, the potential lifting of economic sanctions would alleviate pressure on ordinary Iranians and enable the clerical establishment to retain its hold on power. However, this scenario challenges the fundamental principle of national security. While Iran has demonstrated some willingness to reduce its uranium enrichment, the introduction of elements from the National Security Presidential Memorandum into the negotiation process would demand the complete dismantling of its defensive and ballistic missile capabilities, posing a significant threat to the state’s security apparatus.
With tensions at an all-time high and direct confrontations with Israel having recently escalated, a crucial question emerges: is Iran truly in a position to gamble its national defence infrastructure and scale back its nuclear ambitions in exchange for the prospect of economic prosperity?