What is next for Iran and Israel?
October 05, 2025 - Written by Aydin Dezfouli
Introduction
Operation Rising Lion was launched by Israel on June 13 2025, targeting Iran’s nuclear infrastructure and senior officials of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps. The unexpected use of a US B-12 “bunker buster” against the Fordow Uranium Enrichment Plant (Shahid Ali Mohammadi Nuclear Facility), accelerated hostilities and contributed to a fragile ceasefire after twelve days of conflict. This report assesses the outcomes of this twelve-day war, concentrating on diplomatic and military dimensions and analysing the principal challenges facing both states. Through policy analysis, it evaluates plausible scenarios and sets out the likely implications.
Context Analysis
Diplomacy
Netanyahu’s objective of disrupting “U.S–Iran negotiations” succeeded with the launch of Operation Rising Lion. The twelve-day operation undermined diplomatic engagement and constrained the International Atomic Energy Agency. The US decision to strike the with a B-12 Spirit bomber directly supported Israel’s campaign against Iran. Although a ceasefire was reached, Tehran’s mistrust of Washington deepened. Nevertheless, senior officials, including Ali Larijani and Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi, reiterated Iran’s willingness to engage in negotiations, citing the country’s increasing isolation and vulnerability.
Restricted access to nuclear sites at Natanz and Fordow has limited IAEA “ongoing” inspections to the Bushehr power plant. This development heightened concerns regarding Iran’s enriched uranium stockpiles, prompting the United Kingdom, France, and Germany to warn of potential sanctions. In response, Araghchi accused European powers of aligning with “recent” U.S policy and raised the prospect of triggering the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action snapback mechanism. This mechanism was enacted and the UN snapback sanctions have been placed on Tehran, along with the U.S. imposing sanctions on Iran following the snapback measures.
Indirect negotiations between U.S envoy Steve Walker and Araghchi reached a fifth round, focused on Iran’s proposal to scale back uranium enrichment from 60% to 3.67% in return for lifting of sanctions. However, the twelve-day conflict disrupted progress and eroded trust in the diplomatic process. President Trump maintained confidence that the Fordow strike had neutralised the immediate nuclear threat, shifting Washington’s policy priorities under National Security Presidential Memorandum (NSPM)-2 towards the dismantling of Iran’s ballistic missile programme and the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps. Iran, however, has firmly rejected disarmament, framing its missile arsenal as essential to national defence against Israel. Despite ongoing negotiations, Trump described this joint military actions as a “success”. The United Kingdom expressed diplomatic support, affirming Israel’s right to self-defence. Conversely, the United Nations condemned Israel’s conduct as a violation of international law under Article 2(4) of the UN Charter.
Military
In the early hours of 13 June, 2025, senior officials of the IRGC and affiliated scientists were targeted and assassinated. Explosions across Tehran paralysed security operations until Iranian air defences were reactivated after twelve hours. In retaliation, Iranian ballistic and supersonic missiles penetrated Israel’s Iron Dome and David’s Sling systems, striking Tel Aviv and Haifa. Simultaneously, Israeli F-35 aircraft asserted air superiority over Iranian territory, conducting strikes on nuclear and military facilities in Tehran, Isfahan, Shiraz, and other major cities. The scale of confrontation marked Iran’s most direct engagement in war since the Iran–Iraq conflict of the 1980s, challenging Israeli assumptions of rapid dominance.
Contrary to Netanyahu’s call for the Iranian people to “rise up” against the “oppressive regime” and influence campaigns conducted within Iran the outcome was quite the opposite. As Mearsheimer notes, the episode prompted Iranians to rally around the flag and direct their opposition towards Israel instead.
The ceasefire declared on 24 June remains fragile, with widespread speculation of renewed hostilities. Israeli Defence Minister, Israel Katz, publicly signalled a willingness to authorise the assassination of Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei, warning of “far greater power and consequences” for Tehran. In response, senior IRGC adviser Yaha Ravim Safavi, cautioned that the situation does not constitute a genuine ceasefire but rather a precarious state of war, leaving the risk of escalation unresolved.
The Iranian–Russian Comprehensive Strategic Plan has increasingly tested Tehran’s patience. While Iran has supplied Shahed-136 drones to support Russia’s military operations in Ukraine, Moscow has failed to deliver on reciprocal commitments. The Kremlin has delayed the transfer of the S-400 surface-to-air missile system, as well as the promised Sukhoi-35 fighter jets and Mi-28 attack helicopters. In light of these unfulfilled agreements, Tehran has turned its attention towards China, signalling interest in acquiring advanced military hardware, including the Chengdu J-10C fighter jets.
As the Israeli Defense Forces continue its war in Gaza, despite agreements of a ceasefire recently being made, Tel Aviv has expanded its military campaign across the wider region. Despite a ceasefire agreement with Lebanon, by September 2025 Israel had conducted strikes on six sovereign states within a seventy-two-hour period. The unexpected attack on Doha, Qatar has heightened tensions between Washington and the Gulf states, raising concerns over regional stability and the sustainability of U.S partnerships in the Middle East.
Challenges
The twelve-day war has led the Iranian clerical establishment to promote pre-Islamic nationalism that it once suppressed, as a means of rallying domestic support. To reinforce this narrative, certain social restrictions have eased, including a relaxation of Islamic dress codes and the authorisation of live art and music performances in public spaces such as Azadi Square. However, public backing remains limited and constrained by broader economic and social pressures. Iran continues to face severe economic challenges under international sanctions. According to the International Monetary Fund, GDP growth in 2025 is projected at just 0.3%, while inflation has risen to 43.5%. During the June conflict, the Middle East Forum reported that Iran’s economy experienced a major shock: non-oil exports fell by 34% to $3.4 billion, and oil exports to China declined by 16%, resulting in daily losses of roughly $1.36 million.
The humanitarian situation “in Iran” has also deteriorated. ReliefWeb has warned that ‘Iran’s safe and sufficient water supply for drinking, hygiene, agriculture, livestock, and electricity generation is under serious threat.’ Politically, this crisis has further strained the government’s capacity to manage the estimated six million Afghan refugees living in Iran. Framed by authorities as a security risk, around 1.9 million Afghan nationals now face mass deportation from Iran.
Overturning the authority of the judicial courts, the 7 October attack by Hamas prompted Prime Minister Netanyahu to establish an emergency government, effectively postponing corruption trials. The war in Gaza has triggered widespread international condemnation. An Amnesty International investigation concluded that Israel is committing genocide against Palestinians in Gaza. As the humanitarian crisis deepens, pressure is mounting on states and blocs to suspend cooperation with Tel Aviv and Netanyahu’s policies.
A petition signed by 314 signatories has also called on EU member states to recognise Palestine as a state, adding momentum to the 157 countries that have already done so. Support from key allies such as the United Kingdom, France, Belgium, and Australia have strengthened the case for Palestinian recognition at the United Nations.
According to data collected by The Wall Street Journal and The Middle East Monitor, the twelve-day war against Iran has cost Israel an estimated $200 million per day. This figure includes the expense of intercepting approximately 400 Iranian missiles using the David’s Sling and Arrow-3 defence systems, at a cost ranging from $700,000 to $4 million per interceptor. Additional costs included around $10,000 per hour for each F-35 mission over Iranian airspace. The Aaron Institute for Economic Policy estimated that, had the conflict extended to one month, the overall cost to Israel would have exceeded over $12 billion.
Possible Outcomes
According to Trita Parsi of the Quincy Institute for Responsible Statecraft, Israel pursues three principal objectives with respect to Iran:
(1) to provoke a direct conflict between the United States and Iran;
(2) to decapitate the Iranian regime;
(3) to reduce Iran to a “failed” state comparable to Syria or Lebanon, thereby enabling Israel to strike with impunity and to constrain Tehran’s capacity to rebuild its military capabilities.
Having initiated the conflict, time is not necessarily on Tel Aviv’s side, yet it is likely that Israel will continue to pursue these objectives. The outcome is expected to extend beyond twelve days, with a stated intent to complete the mission as rapidly and decisively as possible, potentially entailing heavier bombardment. As of September, the Trump administration reports a $6 billion arms sale to Israel. This followed Israel’s announcement of the Iron Beam, an anti-missile laser system, developed by Rafael Advanced Defense Systems. The low-cost, high-powered, laser-based system is designed to destroy incoming missiles with greater accuracy. Iran is also likely to deploy its most capable assets in the initial days of hostilities; however, its conventional firepower would be severely challenged should the United States intervene directly. Such an intervention, and the resulting escalation, could produce catastrophic consequences for the Islamic Republic and regional stability.
Iran’s remaining options are limited to either all out retaliation for survival or renewed negotiation. For President Trump, acceptable talks would likely require Iran to neutralise its defensive and ballistic missile capabilities. There is speculation of a shift within Iran’s political establishment, with reformist elements more open to diplomacy. Gradually, these currents could erode traditional norms within Iran and increase the prospect of internal political change, including the possibility of government transition.
Opportunities:
A political transition could yield cooperation and diplomacy, paving the way for economic recovery and greater political stability in Iran.
International pressure seeks to constrain Israel’s military campaign across the region; several states have initiated boycotts of Israeli goods. International organisations provide in-depth risk analysis, reducing reliance on national intelligence alone when formulating policy responses.
Nuclear disarmament action against Iran sets an example for other regional players, while equalising the balance of power.
Risk:
Wider regional conflict could force the closure of the Strait of Hormuz. Disruption to oil exports is predicted to push crude prices to around $130 per barrel, raise US inflation to about 6% and Eurozone inflation to roughly 4%, and reduce global GDP by an estimated 0.3%.
Should Washington pursue a direct military confrontation with Iran, U.S. bases in the region would be likely primary targets a risk illustrated by the incidents at Al Udeid Air Base in 2025 and Al-Asad Airbase in 2020.
A clear show of military superiority would allow Israel an open access to regional domination and put them in direct confrontation with other regional players, namely Türkiye.
Key Players:
United States
The Trump administration has adopted a harder line towards Tehran than previous administrations. Prior to the outbreak of the twelve-day war, successive rounds of negotiations led by US envoy Steve Walker sought to secure Tehran’s commitment to reduce its uranium enrichment by a specified deadline. By authorising a direct strike on the Fordow nuclear site, Washington now finds itself balancing its role as a determined military backer of Israel or to avoid being drawn into a broader, direct military campaign in the Middle East. (NSPM)-2, the administration’s negotiating framework has now shifted its focus to Iran’s defence capabilities. The memorandum prioritises the neutralisation of Iran’s ballistic-missile arsenal and related military capacities as preconditions for meaningful talks, while retaining the option of escalating economic sanctions. Both approaches are designed to degrade Tehran’s military potential and, if fully realised, would substantially reduce Iran’s ability to contest Israeli military actions across multiple domains.
China & Russia
While Iran has supplied drones to support Russia’s military operations in Ukraine, the Kremlin’s response to Israeli actions has been limited to condemnation. Were Moscow to provide overt military assistance to Tehran, its relations with Israel would be further strained and Moscow’s diplomatic positioning on Ukraine could become more complicated.
China, by contrast, seeks to stabilise its relationship with the United States while maintaining a pivotal diplomatic role in the Middle East to protect its economic and strategic interests. Direct military assistance to Iran would risk undermining Beijing’s infrastructure projects and investments in the Gulf and could force difficult trade-off decisions between security support and economic engagement.
Azerbaijan
The long-standing relationship between Azerbaijan and Israel played a significant role in the twelve-day war. Tehran accused Baku of providing “intelligence support to Israel” during strikes on nuclear, military and civilian sites. Iran’s ambassador to Armenia, Mehdi Sobhani, has alleged that Israeli drones operating from Baku conducted intelligence-gathering missions inside Iran. Since 2021, Israel has emerged as a leading military supplier to Azerbaijan, a relationship that deepened after the IRGC mobilised large troop formations near the border. These developments have complicated Tehran’s security calculus and fuelled accusations of Azerbaijani complicity in the attacks.
Yemen
With Iranian proxy networks in Gaza, Lebanon and Syria largely dismantled, the Houthis remain the last significant external proxy. Since the outbreak of the Israel–Gaza war, missiles and rockets launched from Yemen by Houthi forces have struck cities in Israel and targeted commercial shipping in the Red Sea, disrupting maritime traffic and raising regional security concerns.
Conclusion
As in 1967, Israel once again established military superiority and secured occupied control of Syria and Southern Lebanon have reasserted its military dominance in the region. As long as President Trump remains in office, Netanyahu enjoys strong support from Washington and sustained pressure on Iran. Having underestimated Iran’s capabilities during the first round of hostilities, the ceasefire represents a tactical setback that will force Israel to reassess its approach. Meanwhile, Iran remains vulnerable and isolated. It is only a matter of time before Israel’s next course of action becomes clear.
Written by Aydin Dezfouli
Analyst on the Middle East and North Africa Desk