The “Golden Dome”, Chinese exclusion, and mining rights: An overview of the current state of the Greenland crisis
February 06, 2026 - Written by Levi Andre Kvarsnes
With Trump’s Davos statement on the 21st of January defusing previous threats to take Greenland by force, shortly followed by the announcement of a “NATO-framework” to address US security concerns in the Arctic, the Greenland crisis now seems to be deescalating. Instead of a full annexation, stated US aims now seek to secure Greenland for three primary purposes:
To facilitate the establishment of a US “Golden Dome” through US sovereign territorial enclaves in Greenland.
To exclude China and Russia from establishing a presence on the Arctic island.
Acquiring exclusive mineral rights for US companies.
Despite this apparent US de-escalation from its earlier maximalist aims of annexation, the Greenlandic government remains uneasy with the direction of the ongoing diplomatic discussions. The Greenlandic parliament (Inatsisartut) hearing on the 2nd of February highlighted the sustained severity of the situation, with recent trilateral talks pointing to an increasingly worrying trajectory for the future of Greenlandic self-determination. Greenlandic premier Jens-Fredrik Nielsen stated that although military action is seemingly off the table, ongoing talks indicate that the US “still seeks to control and govern Greenland”. Thus, even current American demands seem far beyond what the Greenlanders are likely to accept willingly.
Therefore, despite an apparent de-escalation, the “Greenland crisis” is by no means over, and substantial issues remain to be overcome. Looking more closely at the stated US interests in Greenland, we can identify some of the roadblocks that lie ahead—both from the Greenlandic side, and for the prospects of realising US development of Greenlandic mineral resources.
By far, the question of territorial enclaves under US sovereignty remains the most sensitive issue at hand. The Greenlandic govt. (Naalakkersuisut) has explicitly stated that they will not accept any deal that puts Greenlandic territorial sovereignty at risk—whether it be a full annexation or limited US enclaves on the island. As a small country with a colonial past, territorial sovereignty is a highly sensitive topic in Greenland and will remain a challenging issue in any talks. However, the very practical constraint for the ongoing negotiations is that a comprehensive US-Greenlandic framework already exists—and should at least in theory—be sufficient to accommodate the stated concerns of both the United States and Greenland. As a result, there is little for Greenland to concede beyond matters touching on its own sovereignty.
The existing 1951 agreement both ensures Greenlandic sovereignty, whilst at the same time granting the United States a broad mandate to address their security concerns in the region. Beyond the 1951 agreement, a direct acquisition of Greenlandic territory would offer the United States minimal additional strategic value, whilst incurring significant damage to Greenlandic notions of sovereignty. The idea that the US might acquire even small pockets of territory under US sovereignty remains a “red line” for Greenlandic premier Nielsen. A more feasible option would be that US sovereign bases would be time limited, but even that would prove a hard pill to swallow for the Greenlandic government—especially when Trump has insisted that territorial enclaves would remain under US sovereignty indefinitely.
The other substantial hurdle remains the American insistence on excluding Russia and China from Greenland. Although Russian presence in Greenland is negligible, decoupling from China will be harder for the Greenlanders to accept. Currently, China stands for a considerable part of the Greenlandic export market ($377mm in 2024, rising to approx. $420mm in 2025), providing a steady demand for Greenlandic seafood products. Through an easement of Chinese import controls in 2025, the Greenlandic Chinese trade partnership is expanding and is becoming increasingly important for the small Greenlandic economy that is wholly dependent on its seafood exports.
Although US aims have primarily been focused on the security dimension of a potential Chinese presence in Greenland, there is a real risk that Greenlandic exports to China might end up in the crossfire of US-Greenlandic relations. It is unclear how China might react if they feel unfairly excluded from Greenland, and there is a risk that China could respond by implementing import restrictions on Greenlandic seafood exports.
Another important point of note is that China has long represented an attractive source of capital for a Greenlandic economy that has so far struggled to attract international investments. Up until 2019, China was the only major international actor that seriously considered investing in Greenland, and as late as May 2025 some Greenlandic politicians expressed that Greenland could turn to China if the US hesitates to gear up its investments in the Greenlandic economy. US demands for a Greenlandic-Chinese decoupling will therefore be difficult to accept without significant financial commitments from the US.
The question of US mineral rights in Greenland also raises several important considerations. Despite the aggressive US posture, the development of its burgeoning mining industry is still a top priority of the Greenlandic government, and US investments are still likely to be perceived as a net positive. However, large-scale extraction in Greenland remains far too expensive to be economically feasible at the moment. The development of Greenland’s mineral resources will require substantial infrastructural investments and industrial subsidies—a cashflow that would have to provide steady decade-long prospects for operations under the most challenging conditions in the world. US development of the Greenlandic mining industry will be costly, and it remains an open question whether there is any interest in federal financing for Trump’s Greenland venture. Recent signals from the US congress have not been overly enthusiastic—both on the Democratic and the Republican sides of the aisle.
Although the White House has indeed taken direct equity stakes in rare-earth producers earlier (like in the case of Trilogy Metals and Lithium Americas), recent signals suggest that the US governments rare earth element (REE) investment policy is increasingly favouring projects with a clear path to commercial viability. While the White House has gone back and forth on price-control mechanisms for REE, it is unclear how Greenlandic mining projects would fit into such a framework—if it was to be materialised. Greenlandic rare earth mining would be dependent on direct support beyond price-control mechanisms for large-scale development.
One distinct pathway for Greenlandic projects does, however, exist. The framing of US presence in Greenland as primarily a “Golden Dome” national security issue could allow financing to be routed through the massive US defense budget, where multi-year funding mechanisms and long-term commitments are more readily available. The Pentagon has demonstrated a willingness to take direct equity stakes in REE projects, as illustrated by its recent $400 million investment in MP Materials.
Furthermore, the recent US National Defense Strategy explicitly emphasises the importance of securing not only military but also commercial access to Greenland. Pentagon funding would therefore offer an advantage in the Greenlandic context, as securing stand-alone congressional appropriations has so far met limited enthusiasm. On a more speculative note, one might even imagine a distant possibility that sovereign US territorial enclaves could serve both military and commercial purposes. However, the extent of US federal willingness to finance high-cost Greenlandic extraction at scale is yet to be tested.
In conclusion, US deescalation from earlier threats of annexation does little to resolve the real structural constraints that continue to define ongoing discussions over Greenland’s future. While territorial sovereignty remains a red line for both Greenland and Denmark, and excluding China might prove costly without sufficient recompense from the US—it is still unclear whether exclusive US mining rights would tangibly materialise into significant industrial ventures—or merely serve as a symbolic victory for Trumpian diplomacy. Thus, Greenland’s sovereign, commercial, and industrial future still faces high degree of uncertainty.
Written by Levi Andre Kvarsnes
Levi is a contributing analyst who specialises on the Arctic region