Rosatom’s Nuclear Diplomacy and Europe’s Strategic Lag

June 26, 2025 - Written by Denholm Holbrook

As of mid-2025, Russia leads the global market for nuclear power exports, with 26 of the 59 reactors under construction worldwide being Russian builds – 20 of them located abroad. Rosatom, Russia’s state nuclear corporation, claims it controls approximately 70% of the global export market for reactor development and installation. While this figure is difficult to verify, the scale of its involvement in the market is undeniable. More than a supplier, Rosatom has become a strategic architect of civil nuclear development, particularly across the Global South. Its integrated, state-backed model enables Russia to forge long-term partnerships and exert geopolitical influence through infrastructure, fuel supply, and sustained technical cooperation.

In my previous report, I examined how Rosatom was deepening its energy ties within the Eurasian Economic Union (EEU). This piece broadens that focus, examining Russia’s nuclear engagements across both the EEU and Latin America as two distinct theatres of influence. While the Russian model of nuclear development has reached nearly every continent except North America, this report focuses specifically on Russia’s nuclear engagements in the EEU and Latin America – examining Rosatom’s role as a foreign policy instrument and the implications for Western competition, particularly in Europe.

EEU: Strategic Depth and Integration Through Energy

Since the collapse of the Soviet Union, Russia has sought to reassert its role as the primary strategic partner for former republics. Within the EEU, this ambition is increasingly realised through energy diplomacy, with Rosatom functioning as a state instrument to bind member states into long-term high-dependency nuclear agreements. Through Rosatom, Moscow finances, builds, and fuels nuclear power plants in Armenia, Belarus, Kazakhstan, and Kyrgyzstan. This section will focus on both Armenia and Kazakhstan as two primary instances of Russian nuclear diplomacy.

Between Energy Security and Strategic Constraint: Armenia’s Nuclear Ties with Russia

Few examples better illustrate Russia’s use of nuclear energy as a tool of strategic dependency than Armenia. The Metsamor Nuclear Power Plant, a Soviet-built VVER-440 unit near Yerevan, generates approximately one-quarter of the country’s electricity with this plant continuing operation only through Russia’s continued support. In 2014, Moscow agreed to a $270 million loan (at 3% interest) and a $30 million grant to finance critical upgrades enabling a 10-year life extension to 2026. In 2023, Yerevan and Rosatom went further – signing a $65 million contract to extend Metsamor’s operation to 2036, with discussions ongoing between Armenia and Rosatom to construct another reactor.

Armenia imports fuel directly from Rosatom’s fuel division (TVEL), under a general contract that covers the reactor’s entire lifetime, providing favourable credit terms for the sale of fuel. As a result of the fuel imports from Russia, the Armenian company Metsamor has incurred a debt of around $40 million, leading to a unique arrangement: a Russian company subsidiary (RAO UES) has effectively taken over Metsamor’s financial management in order to service its debt to TVEL. This means Metsamor’s revenue flows and operational decisions have been overseen by Russia for nearly two decades. In exchange, Armenia secured reliable fuel and services, but at the expense of losing a degree of its energy sovereignty. This has created an effective strategic anchor for Moscow, as despite disagreements, their Armenia’s reliance on Russian nuclear fuel and technical aid limits its freedom to pivot away from Moscow’s orbit without jeopardising roughly 25-30% of its electricity supply – meaning it is greatly discouraged from pursuing contracts with other states (such as France and the U.S.). Despite recent claims that Armenian relations with Russia have been deteriorating, reliance on Russia for energy shared nuclear servicing may remain the critical through line that sustains their bilateral relations, when Moscow is no longer viewed as a strong regional guarantor.

Prime Minister of Armenia, Nikol Pashinyan, and CEO of Rosatom, Alexey Likhachev, in 2022.

From Mine to Megawatt: Kazakhstan’s Path to Nuclear Power

Kazakhstan stands apart from many other states due to its position as a leading global uranium exporter, giving it significant leverage in its nuclear relationship with Russia. Kazakhstan produces the largest quantity of uranium globally (estimated to be around 40%). Kazakhstan is eager to develop nuclear power and is deeply involved with Russia in through the nuclear fuel cycle supply of uranium, yet it has also sought to balance Russian influence by engaging multiple partners. Kazakhstan has not had an operating nuclear power plant since 1999, when its only BN-350 reactor (an antiquated Soviet model) was decommissioned. As the world’s largest uranium producer, Kazakhstan has been a major supplier to Rosatom’s fuel needs and hosts several Russian-Kazakh joint ventures. Through its subsidiary Uranium One, Rosatom owns stakes in at least half a dozen Kazakh uranium mines, making Kazakhstan a cornerstone of Russia’s uranium supply chain.

The latest development is Kazakhstan’s plan to build its first nuclear power reactors by 2035, where Rosatom is now poised to play a leading role. After years of deliberation and even a public referendum (in which over 70% of voters backed the construction of a new plant), the Kazakh government announced in 2023 that it will proceed with producing nuclear energy – aiming for about 2.4 GW of capacity. In June 2025, the Kazakh Atomic Energy Agency made an important announcement, that Rosatom and China’s CNNC will lead two separate consortiums to build the country’s first nuclear power stations (the latest two-unit Gen 3+ reactors) in another win for Russian nuclear diplomacy.

Russia’s influence via nuclear energy in Kazakhstan remains significant. If Rosatom builds the new Ulken plant, Kazakhstan will for the first time import a large Russian nuclear installation onto its soil. That carries long-term commitments to Russian fuel supply, maintenance services, and operational support. Rosatom typically signs 10+ year fuel contracts with new-build clients; Kazakhstan could leverage its own uranium and fuel fabrication capacity, but it may still need TVEL’s specific fuel assemblies for VVERs (unless Kazatomprom, Kazakhstan’s national atomic company, co-produces them under license). This will also likely involve the continued training of Kazakh plant operators by Rosatom. In summary, Kazakhstan is embracing nuclear power in a way that increases technical interdependence with Russia, even as it tries to avoid a monopolistic scenario. The outcome will likely see Moscow emerge as a key, though not exclusive, player in Kazakh nuclear development - providing the Kremlin with considerable economic and technical leverage in one of Central Asia’s major economies.

Latin America: Quiet Expansion Through Technological Partnerships

Russia’s state nuclear corporation Rosatom has emerged as a key instrument of Moscow’s diplomacy in Latin America. In recent years (especially since 2022), Rosatom has deepened nuclear partnerships across the region, offering reactor technology, fuel supplies, training, and financing to willing partners. Latin American governments, for their part, often frame these partnerships as advances in technology and energy sovereignty, whilst Russia leverages them to secure long-term influence and access to strategic resources.

As members of the BRICS+, Brazil and Russia have enjoyed growing cooperation in both nuclear development and in their broader strategic partnership. Since 2022, collaboration between Rosatom and the Brazilian government have rapidly advanced. In December 2022, Russia scored a major win when Brazil’s state nuclear fuel company, Indústrias Nucleares do Brasil (INB), awarded Rosatom’s subsidiary, Internexco, a contract to supply 330,000kg of natural uranium hexafluoride from 2023 through to 2027. This followed an open international tender and marks Rosatom’s first long-term enriched uranium supply contract in Brazil (and indeed more broadly in Latin America). It effectively cements Russia as an important fuel provider for Brazil’s Angra 1 and 2 nuclear power plants – the only operating reactors currently in the country.

Concurrently, in October 2022 Brazil’s nuclear holding company ENBPar signed a memorandum of understanding with Rosatom to promote mutual cooperation in nuclear energy broadly. By 2023–24, the Brazil-Russia nuclear dialogue had accelerated significantly under President Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva. In May 2023, during Lula’s visit to Moscow – his first in over a decade – energy cooperation was a central focus. Brazil’s Mines and Energy Minister (Alexandre Silveira) announced that Rosatom would begin engaging with Brazil on developing small modular reactors (SMRs) that are “vital for our energy future.”

Politically, Brazil has welcomed Rosatom’s partnership as part of a broader south-south and BRICS-aligned strategy. Even as the war in Ukraine raged, Brazil refused to sanction Russia and continued high-level exchanges, defying intentional pressure. Both countries portray this as a mutually beneficial technology exchange: Brazil gains access to Russian expertise (in reactors, fuel fabrication, etc.), while Russia gains a major client and political goodwill. If plans materialise, Brazil could host Russian SMR (small modular reactor) units in coming years – a development with both economic and geopolitical weight for both states. Additionally, U.S. and European firms have shown interest in Brazil’s new build plans (and the U.S. has floated the idea of its own SMRs for Brazil). However, Rosatom’s willingness to provide attractive financing and comprehensive solutions – from fuel to training – gives it an edge. Russia is consistently able to leverage Rosatom to provide strategic dependencies, integrating itself into BRICS+ discussions and tying Brazil to Russian fuel channels, as this likely only signals the beginning of what will be continued development.

Bolivia: A Flagship Nuclear Technology Centre at Altitude

Perhaps the most emblematic Rosatom venture in Latin America is in Bolivia, where the Russian state enterprise is building an entire nuclear research complex from the ground up. The Nuclear Research and Technology Center (NRTC) in El Alto (on the Andean plateau near La Paz) is Rosatom’s largest project in the region, hailed as the first of its kind on the continent. The centerpiece is a 200 kW pool-type research reactor (the Russian-designed BR-01), which will be used to produce radioisotopes, conduct materials research, and train personnel. At over 4,000 meters above sea level, the El Alto reactor will be the highest-altitude nuclear reactor in the world, a fact showcasing Russian engineering prowess and Bolivia’s determination to acquire advanced nuclear technology.

The project originated under President Evo Morales, who in the mid-2010s sought to ‘nuclearize’ Bolivia for peaceful purposes after earlier notions of a power reactor were shelved post-Fukushima. In March 2016, Bolivia and Russia signed a nuclear cooperation agreement, and by September 2017, Bolivia’s Nuclear Energy Agency (ABEN), finalised an EPC contract with Rosatom to build the El Alto centerreactor. The agreed initial cost was reported at around $300 million, financed via a Russian state loan (with Bolivia to repay over time). Construction was delayed by political turmoil – a late 2019 coup and interim government put the project on hold – but the project resumed in 2021 after President Luis Arce (Morales’ ally) took office. Crucially, Rosatom’s role extends to human capacity building and institutional setup. Since Bolivia had no prior nuclear power infrastructure, hundreds of Bolivian engineers, scientists, and students are being trained under Rosatom’s wing. Rosatom has provided scholarships and courses: in late 2024, 18 Bolivian scholarship students travelled to Russia’s Tomsk Polytechnic University for an 8-month course on research reactor operation. Politically, the Bolivia-Russia nuclear partnership has been very robust.

The project has survived Bolivia’s regime change and enjoys cross-cutting widespread support among the current ruling party (MAS). President Arce frequently endorses the NRTC (Nuclear Research and Technology Centre) as a symbol of “technological sovereignty” for Bolivia. This tactic often encompasses Russia’s broader strategy to appeal to regional governments who seek an alternative to the ‘no strings attached’ style of cooperation to counter the pervasive model of U.S. privatisation-led development employed by many other nuclear exporters. Despite appearing to embody this style of trade and development, Russian state objectives are still deeply integrated into all actions of both the consulate and state-led bodies such as Rosatom. This is achieved through a debt-led development style, or through encouraging deeper political cooperation between states.

For Russia, the payoff is not only diplomatic support but also economic and strategic support. Working in parallel to with the nuclear project, Rosatom’s mining subsidiary, Uranium One Group, secured a major lithium concession in Bolivia in 2023. This arrangement reflects Russia’s broader strategy of nuclear engagements often going hand-in-hand with securing raw material partnerships – in this case, helping Bolivia monetise its lithium in exchange for a stake in the supply. These links strengthen the bilateral relationship beyond the just realm of nuclear energy and towards a sustained economic and strategic partnership.

Balancing Ties: Latin America Between Europe and Rosatom

Europe historically built some of Latin America’s nuclear capacity (e.g. Germany’s Siemens firm designed Argentina’s and Brazil’s second reactors; France’s Areva was involved in Angra 3). European nuclear firms (France’s Framatome, Spain’s ENUSA, Britain’s Urenco, etc.) still supply fuel and services to the region’s reactors. However, as Europe distances itself from Russian energy, it is simultaneously losing ground in markets where Rosatom is most active. The EU has expressed concern that Rosatom’s international expansion funds the Russian state and could propagate lower non-proliferation standards or increase geopolitical dependence. Some European Parliament members have even called for sanctioning Rosatom and cutting off its global business to constrain Russian expansion in this sector. Nonetheless, major Latin American partners such as Brazil and Argentina maintain long-standing relationships with European states and are likely to continue balancing these alongside emerging partnerships with Russia. For example, Brazil buys reactor components from France and signed nuclear cooperation deals with countries like France and Japan as well. In essence, Latin America is adopting a multi-partner strategy: engaging Russia and China for new opportunities, while keeping traditional links to Europe and the U.S. when beneficial. This aligns with the region’s broader foreign policy trend of non-alignment and diversification. Countries like Brazil and Argentina emphasise a multipolar world order; cooperating with Rosatom fits that narrative, as they don’t want to rely exclusively on Western technology or financing. European energy agencies have attempted to deepen bilateral development, with EU Commissioner for Energy, Dan Jørgensen, and the Executive Secretary of the Latin American Energy Organisation (OLADE), Andrés Rebolledo, signing a MoU to jointly strengthen energy matters earlier this May – promoting a greater involvement of EU stakeholders regionally.

Institutionalising European Nuclear Diplomacy: Towards a Unified Export Strategy

Unlike oil and gas, the nuclear energy sector does not follow the same geographical or market constraints. While fossil fuels confer power primarily through production and transfer capabilities, nuclear leverage is exerted through technology transfer, reactor design, fuel fabrication, and long term servicing contracts between states. Notably, some of the world’s largest uranium exporters (such as Australia and Canada) are not major producers of nuclear energy themselves. Rather than relying solely on natural resource endowments, the advancement of nuclear energy is more closely tied to the capacity of domestic research institutions and the extent of public investment in scientific infrastructure. This disconnect means that resource control does not automatically translate into strategic influence, making it harder for traditional energy exporters to compete with vertically integrated state actors like Rosatom, which offers full-cycle solutions from reactor construction to fuel supply and decommissioning.

Russian state firms (such as Rosatom) offer end to-end services with comparatively little outsourcing relative to Euro area developers. These state companies offer fuel cycle support through subsidiaries and partners (such as TVEL), and train staff closely with Russian educational institutions, all funded by the state. This is often paired with lower interest rates for state-backed loans, which occasionally practice partial debt forgiveness (in favour of political concessions); such integrated financing models remain difficult for Western developers such as Rolls-Royce (UK), Westinghouse (U.S), or EDF (France).

Rosatom is also frequently promoted through the Russian consulate, which as discussed, supports the signing of MoUs (such as in the case of Brazil and Bolivia), which were formalised in tandem with consular efforts during official state visits. This crucial facet of soft power is underutilised by European exporters, which usually rely on private negotiations devoid of state interference. Russia typically frames these ventures as supporting the ‘technological sovereignty’ of states, emphasising state-to-state solidarity. Further, they help to shape narratives around Rosatom as a peaceful, apolitical provider of energy security, assisting to counter further Russian expansion.

European nuclear export strategy remains fragmented, with Germany’s (along with many other EU states) exit from nuclear power generation culminating in a passive regional bloc strategy. The European Investment Bank (EIB) largely avoids nuclear financing due to long-standing policy concerns; however, reconsidering this stance may be essential if Europe is to compete effectively with state-backed Russian development. If this proved to be politically infeasible, a dedicated nuclear infrastructure fund (in conjunction with Euratom, the EU’s premier body for nuclear development) could be considered. Such a mechanism could be designed to provide concessional financing, export credit guarantees, and structured risk-sharing instruments to support the deployment of European nuclear technologies in partnering countries.

There has been ongoing discussion around expanding Euratom’s membership framework to include additional partner states, most notably the United Kingdom post-Brexit, in order to leverage its emerging SMR capabilities and deepen strategic alignment in nuclear technology development. Although the UK and EU have maintained agreements for trading radioactive isotopes since 2020, the UK no longer participates directly in Euratom’s research programs or governance. However, there have been indications from EU member states supporting the UK’s potential return for the next Euratom R&D cycle starting in 2028. Europe’s most viable counterweight may reside in its SMR capacity, particularly in the UK, where export potential is rapidly growing. With Rolls-Royce chosen as the UK’s lead developer for small modular reactor (SMR) technology, there is strong potential for the UK to be an early mover in this field (backed by 2.5 billion pounds in domestic funding), positioning SMRs as a viable export. The Rolls-Royce SMR - a 470 MWe pressurised water reactor - has been designed with export in mind. The company projects up to £250 billion in export opportunities by 2050 and has already signed agreements with countries including Estonia, Turkey, and Czechia to explore possible deployments. To fully realise this potential, cross-border collaboration must be scaled and aligned with the EIB’s financing mechanisms – ensuring that emerging nuclear technologies can be deployed with institutional backing across Europe and beyond.

EU foreign delegations could co-sponsor SMR or fuel cycle agreements with African or Latin American nations as part of Europe's Global Gateway initiative (a mobilisation fund for sustainable investments). In an increasing multilateral world, European states should adopt the dialogue of neutrality in development projects. While Europe doesn’t have a Rosatom equivalent, coordinated export consortia (EDF–Framatome–CEA, or Rolls-Royce SMR–UK Export Finance) could be deployed with explicit multilateral state endorsement and branding. Euratom, often limited to regulation and R&D, could consider expanding its role into diplomatic facilitation and strategic alignment.

Rosatom at the Russia-Africa Summit in 2023.

Concluding Remarks

While this report focuses primarily on the EEU and Latin America, it underscores the broader trajectory of Russia’s global nuclear outreach. As of mid-2025, Rosatom is actively expanding into Asia, with negotiations underway in Malaysia for the potential construction of new nuclear power plants. This marks a continued eastward pivot in Russia’s nuclear diplomacy and reinforces Rosatom’s role as a vehicle for long-term strategic influence far beyond its traditional spheres.

Rosatom’s activities in Latin America since 2022 illustrate a highly comprehensive engagement – spanning commercial, scientific, and political spheres. Economically, Russian-backed nuclear projects promise host countries new energy infrastructure, industrial investment, and skilled jobs (often with generous financing from state entities). This model provides Russia not just with increased cooperation and finance, but a broader opportunity to ensure strategic alignment with developing states. With an ageing population and poor investment flows from sanctioning states, Russia continues to plan for its most difficult challenge – the long term. For Europe, the inverse appears to be the case, as short-term flexibility will be necessary to respond to the challenges of an increasingly multipolar world - one in which flexibility may define its strategic relevance in coming decades.

Rosatom’s Nuclear Diplomacy and Europe’s Strategic Lag