Is a Fear of a Nuclear Arms Race Inevitable?
May 13, 2025 - Written by Ayusha Pandey
Introduction
Washington in the 1960s saw President JFK sound a prescient warning. Without international cooperation, the world might soon see a proliferation of nuclear weapons across 15 to 25 states — a scenario that risked global catastrophe. To avoid this, the United States spearheaded the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT), founded on a strategic bargain: non-nuclear states would refrain from developing such weapons, and existing nuclear powers would gradually disarm. Crucially, the US would extend its “nuclear umbrella” over its allies, dissuading them from seeking independent deterrents.
This architecture of deterrence and restraint has endured for over half a century. Yet, following Donald Trump’s re-election to the presidency, long standing assumptions underpinning global nuclear stability appear increasingly fragile.
Trump’s administration previously withdrew from landmark arms control agreements, including the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty, and showed disinterest in renewing the New Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (New START). His transactional approach to alliances, scepticism of NATO, and affinity for autocratic leaders such as Vladimir Putin have further unsettled allies. In this context, the question that once seemed unthinkable now demands urgent consideration: if U.S. security guarantees can no longer be taken for granted, should states begin preparing for a post-American nuclear order?
Germany: A Taboo Revisited
Germany — one of the foremost beneficiaries of the American nuclear shield — finds itself at the centre of this re-evaluation. Although Berlin has long adhered to its NPT obligations and maintained a strong anti-nuclear stance domestically, recent developments suggest a subtle but significant shift in strategic discourse.
Friedrich Merz, the conservative leader and likely successor to Chancellor Olaf Scholz, has proposed that Germany explore enhanced nuclear cooperation with the United Kingdom and France. This proposal, while still controversial, has sparked an unprecedented public debate on the future of nuclear deterrence in Europe. Although German officials continue to publicly affirm reliance on NATO, internal discussions have reportedly raised the possibility albeit tentatively of developing an independent deterrent.
For a country whose post-war identity is rooted in peace and disarmament, even entertaining such debates reflects a profound erosion of trust in traditional security frameworks.
Japan: Nuclear Restraint Under Pressure
Japan remains a global symbol of nuclear restraint, maintaining its Three Non-Nuclear Principles: no possession, no production, and no introduction of nuclear weapons. Yet strategic anxiety is rising in Tokyo. With China rapidly expanding its arsenal and North Korea continuing to test ballistic missiles, Japan’s reliance on the United States as a sole guarantor of nuclear security is increasingly questioned by policymakers and academics alike.
Japan possesses both the technological capacity and the fissile material required to develop a nuclear weapon within a matter of months, a status known as “nuclear latency.” Although no mainstream political leader has publicly advocated for nuclear armament, think tanks and defence scholars have openly discussed the prudence of maintaining the option to “go nuclear” if regional tensions escalate or if American commitments waver.
The domestic political taboo remains intact — for now. However, Japan’s nuclear posture could shift dramatically in the event of a sustained security crisis or further retrenchment by Washington.
South Korea: The Emerging Threshold State
South Korea presents one of the most acute nuclear dilemmas of the twentieth century. Situated in direct proximity to an increasingly aggressive and nuclear-armed North Korea, Seoul’s faith in extended deterrence is facing its most serious test yet.
Public sentiment has shifted decisively: a growing majority of South Koreans now support the development of an indigenous nuclear deterrent. Although neither major political party has formally endorsed such a move, leading figures have advocated the pursuit of “nuclear threshold” status — the capacity to weaponise rapidly without violating the NPT outright. Seoul’s conservative mayor, Oh Se-hoon, has suggested that the U.S. should permit South Korea to stockpile enriched nuclear material, mirroring Japan’s latent capability.
Given its advanced civilian nuclear infrastructure and the immediacy of the North Korean threat, South Korea is arguably the closest to crossing the nuclear Rubicon among U.S. allies.
Poland: A Catalyst for a European Nuclear Debate
Poland, while lacking nuclear capability of its own, has emerged as a vocal advocate for a more robust European deterrent in the face of Russian aggression. Since Russia’s invasion of Ukraine and the increasing unpredictability of U.S. foreign policy under Trump, Polish officials have called for an expanded American nuclear presence in Eastern Europe — including proposals to permanently host U.S. nuclear weapons on Polish soil.
Moreover, Poland has expressed interest in collaborating with France on a potential European nuclear umbrella, reigniting debate over a shared continental deterrent. Although Warsaw lacks the technological base and domestic consensus to pursue a national nuclear programme, its strategic activism suggests a broader shift: if the U.S. retreats from its commitments, key NATO members may begin to reimagine security architecture along more autonomous, and potentially nuclear, lines.
Türkiye: Ambition in Ambiguity
Türkiye poses one of the most complex cases in the contemporary nuclear debate. President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan has openly questioned the global nuclear order, lamenting that some countries are allowed nuclear weapons while others are not. While Türkiye remains a signatory to the NPT and has not developed a nuclear programme, its geopolitical trajectory raises concerns.
Türkiye’s energy cooperation with Russia, including the construction of the Akkuyu nuclear power plant, provides it with access to nuclear technology under a civilian guise. Simultaneously, Erdoğan’s increasingly independent and militarised foreign policy — coupled with deteriorating relations with NATO — has led some analysts to speculate about Türkiye’s long-term intentions.
Though Türkiye is unlikely to pursue nuclear weapons in the immediate term, the combination of technological access, strategic ambition, and nationalist rhetoric renders it a plausible proliferation risk should the global non-proliferation regime weaken further.
A Fragile Future: The Unravelling of Restraint
The cumulative effect of these shifting national postures is stark. What once was a solid consensus on non-proliferation is now showing signs of stress at its edges. The NPT — though still broadly respected — is no longer sacrosanct. Countries once firmly committed to nuclear restraint are beginning to hedge their bets, not necessarily by building bombs, but by creating the political and technical infrastructure to do so if circumstances demand.
This creeping normalisation of nuclear latency — maintaining the capacity without crossing the line — presents a unique challenge to global stability. It reflects a world in which trust in collective security is diminishing, and states are prioritising autonomy over alliance.
Conclusion
The post-war nuclear order has always been more fragile than it appeared. It relied on a complex web of treaties, diplomatic norms, and, above all, trust — trust in U.S. leadership, in multilateralism, and in the principle that fewer weapons make for a safer world.
Donald Trump’s foreign policy has disrupted this balance. By undermining treaties, sowing doubt among allies, and embracing unilateralism, his leadership has forced many states to contemplate the once unthinkable: life after the American nuclear guarantee.
John F. Kennedy feared a future where nuclear weapons would become the currency of international respect. That future may yet be realised, not through a sudden breakdown, but through a slow erosion — a hesitant, step-by-step walk into a new nuclear age.