Foreign Interventions in the Sahel Region: How Effective are the Multinationalists at Mitigating Conflict and Aiding in Climate Adaptation?
September 12, 2025 _ Written by James Murphy
Introduction
The Sahel region is situated between North Africa and Sub-Saharan Africa in more ways than simple geography. Characterised by a combination of humid savannas commonly found in Sub-Saharan Africa and the arid Saharan landscape of North Africa, the Sahel climate possesses a semi-arid nature, giving it precarious geopolitical positioning. Countries such as Mali and Sudan have suffered from conflicts related to religious extremism, corruption, and climate change. This violence can be linked to the region’s climate: the Sahel suffers from both flooding and drought, with some areas having excessive rainfall while others have seen huge decreases in rainfall in recent decades. These facts compound the issues of resource and water scarcity and lead to widespread competition for basic resources.
Several international initiatives have sought to address these challenges through conflict mitigation and climate adaptation. UN agencies such as the Peacebuilding Fund (PBF) and Multidimensional Integrated Stabilisation Mission in Mali (MINUSMA), alongside initiatives from European governments, and international organisations like the Red Cross and IOM, attempt to promote community participation in projects aimed at regional stability. This report will highlight the successes and failures of these foreign interventions and how their presence could be as much a hindrance as a help.
Contextual Analysis
The Sahel region suffers disproportionately from the effects of climate change, given the widespread economic dependence that the region has on agriculture, such as in Burkina Faso, where agriculture accounts for 40% of GDP. What makes this situation unique is the gendered disparities in both ownership and labour of agricultural assets. Despite owning less than 5% of the land, women in the Sahel contribute 40% of agricultural production and 70% of the labour. Cultural norms often restrict women from land ownership and leadership roles. These cultural restrictions force the region’s largest and most important labour force from active participation in agricultural development projects.
Resource scarcity has fuelled conflicts. Seasonal migration of transhumant pastoralists is the norm, being necessary due to a large portion of the Sahel being too dry for livestock. This migration has led to a symbiotic relationship with agriculturalists, who would welcome pastoralists after their harvests were complete, trading plant biomass in exchange for organic fertiliser from the livestock. However, declining and increasingly unpredictable precipitation has forced pastoralists to increasingly move their herds to farmlands earlier in the season, thereby disrupting agriculturalists’ livelihoods to preserve their own. Localised conflict ensues, exacerbated by religious differences between Christian agriculturalists and Muslim pastoralists and the lack of political representation for the Muslim pastoralist communities. This feeds into the presence of several radical Islamist groups in the region that have ranged from political separatists to community-based armed militias.
These localised conflicts, driven by climate change, spurred the implementation of the UN PBF Projects across Mali, Burkina Faso and Sudan. These projects are designed to provide climate action in conflict-sensitive communities, working with community leaders to develop adaptation strategies and foster more comprehensive decision-making. Alongside the PBF, the UN Development Programme also funds the MINUSMA and the Regional Stabilisation Fund. The UK government has their own Stabilisation and Security Fund, as do the Danish and Norwegian governments, with a joint initiative, the Red Cross, and the World Bank’s two projects aimed at community recovery. Lastly, the Sahel Alliance was set up in 2017 as a multinational initiative, though France has largely taken the lead.
Main Arguments
The agricultural work carried out by women in the region is paramount to sustained economic performance and preventing resource scarcity. As stated, in many instances, cultural and social norms in many communities prohibit women from owning land. When analysing the effectiveness of PBF’s climate adaptation and conflict mitigation projects, we must bear in mind how engagement with community leadership will likely exclude women. This limits communities’ ability to adapt, as those most knowledgeable about the remaining arable land are not invited to the table.
Foreign interventions have also proved to lean towards a more militaristic focus. The MINUSMA largely re-hatted troops from the African-led International Support Mission in Mali, with the initial mandate aimed at human rights promotion and civilian protection, yet gradually became more concerned with the deteriorating security situation following the Tuareg rebellion. The subsequent Bamako Agreement lacked any significant input from women and civil society organisations, leading to a peace process that invariably excluded key interest groups that could have helped mitigate the ongoing issue of political instability in the region.
Before the presence of UN Peacekeepers in the Sahel region, the UN Security Council had not previously triggered Chapter VII of the UN Charter in actions against terrorist threats, yet the shift toward militarism in the region brought on this new territory. MINUSMA joined the French military and the Joint Force of the Group of Five for the Sahel (FC-G5S) in counter-terrorism initiatives, limiting the promotion of their initial goals of positive community engagement and humanitarianism. This makes the impartial position of UN forces complicated: MINUSMA is mandated to assist Malian forces, who have been accused of human rights abuses. Subsequently, UN forces are at risk of losing the trust of communities both in Mali and across the Sahel, with a risk of being accused of complicity and actively undermining the goals of peacebuilding and reconciliation. Beyond Mali, the French-led Sahel Alliance has seen consistent protesting and ongoing civil unrest due to the foreign military presence in Niger and Burkina Faso.
Tens of thousands gathered in Niger’s capital, Niamey, to protest French military presence in July 2023. Credits: https://www.aljazeera.com/gallery/2023/9/3/photos-huge-protests-in-niger-call-for-french-forces-to-leave
Key Stakeholders
National Governments and Regional Alliances: The governments of countries such as Mali, Burkina Faso, Niger, and Sudan have set overarching policy and security strategies. Their cooperation or obstruction of UN goals in the region influences the effectiveness of the UN’s mission. The FC-G5S, made up of five Sahel countries, coordinates regional security responses but also risks being seen as solely militaristic instead of pursuing a development agenda. While the UN, France, and international NGOs play a strong role, the Sahelian governments are still central to both conflict mitigation and climate adaptation strategies. MINUSMA, PBF, and the Red Cross often depend on local governments to implement their programmes and enforce agreements and rules for adaptation strategies surrounding agriculture and pastoralism. Many underlying issues, such as political representation and the exclusion of women in decision-making, stem from state-level governance structures, and therefore shape whether foreign interventions address root causes or merely treat the symptoms.
Foreign Governments and Multinational Alliances: European states such as France, Denmark, and Norway fund and lead interventions, often balancing militaristic goals like counter-terrorism with humanitarian goals such as community development and climate adaptation. The Sahel Alliance, led by France, coordinates foreign support, but military presence has sparked protests.
Women in Agriculture: Given the significant contribution they make to agriculture, women face a great deal of adversity, given the sensitivity in the Sahel, to both conflict scenarios and climate change challenges. Cultural barriers often prevent women from assuming decision making roles, meaning that foreign interventions in the Sahel may be less effective if their strategies are missing the female majority of the labour force, fuelling the most important industry in the regional economy. Nevertheless, women will still face disproportionately harsher consequences given their increased likelihood of having their livelihood affected by climate-induced migration, and more likely to be the victims of theft and sexual violence in the local and regional conflicts that can arise as a result.
Heads of state of Mali's Assimi Goita, Niger's General Abdourahamane Tiani and Burkina Faso's Captain Ibrahim Traore pose for photographs during the first ordinary summit of heads of state and governments of the Alliance of Sahel States (AES) in Niamey, Niger July 6, 2024. Credits: X @GoitaAssimi
Opportunities and Risks
Opportunities
• While there are issues surrounding the effectiveness of international aid in the Sahel region, the IDA and World Bank initiatives have had some positive effects. The Regional Sahel Pastoralism Support Project (PRAPS) has been operating in the Sahel since 2015, providing over $250 million for financing pastoral protection projects and improving resource management across Burkina Faso, Chad, Mali, Mauritania, Niger, and Senegal. Thus far, PRAPS has made significant improvements to the management of over 1.2 million acres of pastureland, 1400 kilometres of transhumance corridors, 180 water points, and 60 cattle markets. By doing so, PRAPS has thus far supported the economic activities of over 20,000 people in the Sahel region, including over 18,000 women.
• Pastoralists and agriculturalists have been put in situations almost as if they have been pitted against each other. The shorter seasons resulted in herds being stolen or suffering from disease, which makes them unsafe to consume. This has caused armed conflict in the Lake Chad Basin and the Liptako Gourma sub-region. In response, the International Committee of the Red Cross has devised a pilot programme that brings together agriculturalists and pastoralists in Niger. These programmes promote sustainable farming techniques, increase veterinary access, seek to help women in nomadic communities, and promote alternative approaches to income generation. These programmes present an alternative to the PBF programmes controlled by the UNDP. The politically-led aid programmes for local communities in the Sahel have brought about controversy and protest. An independent, non-governmental organisation can be a new avenue for building trust and fostering new avenues of female participation and wealth generation.
Risks
• Several radical Islamist groups are in operation across North Africa and the Sahel region, most notably al-Shabaab and Boko Haram. The presence of these militias undermines the support that Sahelian communities can receive. This is due to the religious divides between pastoralists and agriculturalists and the recognition that each of these communities receives. Pastoralists are primarily Muslim, while agriculturalists are primarily Christian. Consequently, especially in Christian-majority countries in the Sahel, pastoralists do not receive any political representation. This often pushes pastoralists towards reliance on more radical and fundamentalist Islamist groups as conflict with agriculturalists arises. This only works to further polarise the communities in need of conflict resolution and climate adaptation strategies.
• Alongside the presence of radical Islamist groups, the Sahel region has been rocked by a multifaceted crisis involving various military entities and community-based militias. This has created an issue of double standards among the foreign entities present in the Sahel region. France and the African Union gave support to the Transitional Military Council (CMT), a military junta present in Chad following the death of President Idriss Deby. Not only was the CMT unconstitutional, but it also routinely suppressed movements pushing for a democratic civilian-led government. This was in contrast to France’s and AU’s treatment of Burkinabe, Malian, and Niger juntas, who all received harsh sanctions. These differing policies towards military juntas in the Sahel were characterised by the CMT’s effectiveness in mitigating conflicts among Islamist groups and community-led militias. Contradictory policies breed responses ranging from confusion to rejection. This fact adds to the controversy of foreign intervention, exacerbating rejection of foreign help from local communities. This can be particularly detrimental to female participation, as military intervention often comes with gendered impacts regarding economic opportunity and sexual violence.
Policy Recommendations
• Foreign interventions in the Sahel must prioritise the structural inclusion of women in decision-making processes regarding land use, agricultural adaptation, and conflict resolution. Given the significant contribution of women to the agricultural sector, interventions should guarantee representation quotas in community leadership forums, provide legal support for land rights, and invest in women-led initiatives. This will ensure adaptation strategies are informed by those with the most direct knowledge of farming conditions and resource scarcity.
• MINUSMA and French-led interventions have overemphasised counter-terrorism operations. This has eroded community trust and side-lined development priorities. Interventions need to be rebalanced by expanding non-militarised programmes such as PRAPS and ICRC’s initiatives to improve resource management and food security. This will help rebuild trust and address resource competition without deepening the cycle of violence.
• Contradictory policies, such as France’s differential treatment of military juntas, undermine legitimacy and fuel perceptions of double standards. Foreign interventionists should align their strategies through coordination with Sahelian governments, local communities, and civil society. Accountability mechanisms must be strengthened to monitor both local governments and foreign actors and their compliance with human rights goals, equitable resource distribution, and strategies to prevent gender-based violence.
Conclusion
Foreign intervention in the Sahel region reflects the region’s climate vulnerability and the ensuing complexity of mitigating conflict. While projects such as PRAPS and Red Cross community initiatives demonstrate the potential for climate-sensitive, non-militarised approaches, the dominance of security-focused interventions has often undermined trust and excluded key groups, particularly women and pastoralists. Amending this will require a decisive shift toward inclusive governance, women’s empowerment, and coherent, development-led strategies that move beyond short-term counter-terrorism objectives. By grounding climate adaptation and conflict mitigation within the realities of communities, foreign interventions can avoid perpetuating instability and instead build resilience for a brighter outcome for the Sahel’s future.
Written by James Murphy
Middle East & North Africa Analyst