A Potential NATO Article V Loophole: How Russia Could Exploit Åland’s Demilitarisation
May 21, 2025 - Written by Jake Southerland
Nestled between Sweden and Finland lies the Swedish-speaking archipelago of Åland, an autonomous province of Finland that has seen its fair share of Swedish, Russian, German, and Finnish control. While often overlooked or forgotten, the Åland Islands hold strategic value in the Baltic Sea’s geography. Its location at the entrance of the maritime crossroads between the Gulf of Bothnia, the Gulf of Finland, and the Baltic Sea allows Finland to hold supremacy over a vital naval route. However, unlike the Swedish island of Gotland, in which Stockholm has recently increased its military presence significantly, Åland has remained demilitarized almost uninterrupted since 1856 (Wieslander & Adamson 2023). The historical reasons for Åland’s demilitarisation will be explored momentarily; however, most importantly, this article’s purpose is to explore how Russia could exploit Åland’s status as a potential loophole in NATO’s Article V: “An attack on one is an attack on all” (NATO 2023).
Control over Åland has been constantly transferred among the regional powers: from Sweden to Russia, then contested between Sweden and newly independent Finland, and then given to Finland on the precondition that the islands remained demilitarized. This was formalized by a 1920 League of Nations mandate, and it has remained the status quo, with a brief Finnish military presence during the early days of Hitler’s invasion of the USSR, Operation Barbarossa, in 1941. However, with Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine in February 2022, a primarily Finnish-led revitalized discussion of Åland’s status has emerged.
While Finland’s ex-Chief of Intelligence of the General Staff, Pekka Toveri, argued that “my view is that they [historical treaties] are basically old, which do not hold well,” Ålander MP, Mats Löfström expressed that “there’s a concern that you start breaking treaties like the one from the League of Nations,” that changes in the status quo will endanger Åland’sspecial status (Dougall 2023). This tension reflects a broader distrust in global institutions like the UN, as their resolutions are increasingly being seen as empty, as seen in their resolution demanding Russia’s immediate withdrawal from Ukraine. Yet, Putin's troops are still operating in Ukraine today, and Trump’s rhetoric towards Europe has created a rift in transatlantic relations, putting NATO’s future into question. While polls conducted by Åland’s government show vast support for the islands’ continued demilitarisation by the local populace, does the current geopolitical landscape enable Finland to deploy troops to Åland? This report outlines a way Russia could exploit this very issue.
Key Players & Stakeholders
Finland: With Åland being a self-governing part of Finland that under legally enforced demilitarisation, defensive plans concerning Åland become increasingly difficult. If Russia were to exert control over Åland, the islands' proximity to Turku, Finland (approx. 135 km or 85 mi) and its important naval installations, would prove to be a severe headache for Finnish President, Alexander Stubb.
Sweden: Similar to Finland, Sweden is historically and culturally connected to the Swedish-speaking population of Åland. Naturally, Sweden is not obligated to protect Åland since it is considered Finnish territory. However, Russian control of the islands would put Russian troops dangerously close to Stockholm (approx. 160 km or 100 mi), thereby putting the Swedes in the same precarious situation as Finland.
Russia: As the aggressor in this scenario, an operation taking over Åland would be a precarious decision that would come with a significant payoff. If Russian forces were to impose an imposed presence on Åland, Moscow would have total control of a strategic maritime crossroads, creating severe militaristic, economic, and social repercussions for Finland, Sweden, and their NATO allies. The ongoing rift within the nation, exacerbated by Trump’s questioning of transatlantic commitments, has fragile the alliance’s cohesion (Bergmann 2025). The fracturing of NATO's unity could embolden Russia to test the waters further, potentially targeting Estonian islands like Hiiumaa and Saaremaa or remote islands in the Gulf of Finland to reinforce the defences of the maritime approach to St. Petersburg.
Åland: The victim in this hypothetical scenario, the demilitarisation of Åland has been the status quo for decades. However, Russia’s behaviour in the past decade has persuaded the Swedish to redeploy troops to the once demilitarised island of Gotland (Martin 2024). With Åland’s strategic location and the evident gap it imposes in Finland’s defensive strategy, it may be time to re-approach the question of Åland’s demilitarisation.
Dimensions To be Considered
Military: Åland’s strategic value is apparent. Still, its legal status provides a gaping hole in NATO’s Nordic-Baltic defence perimeter, a straw for Russia to grasp at “NATO lake.” As explored in the subsequent section, Russia could utilise Åland to monitor and disrupt the region's maritime traffic, mainly Finnish and other NATO naval assets. Due to Mariehamn’s proximity to Turku and Stockholm, modern Russian military equipment, such as drones like the Orlan-10 or other commercial drones, could be modified to deliver lethal payloads. Additionally, the Spetsnaz could likely transport portable weapons systems such as mortars, MANPADS, and electric jammers to significantly increase their defensive capabilities against a possible Finnish or NATO response.
Legal: From the legal standpoint, Russian support for the demilitarisation of the islands is a complex issue with significant implications. This support is enshrined in Article 6 of the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk of 1917, where Leon Trotsky, head of the Soviet delegation, agreed to withdraw Russian and Bolshevik troops immediately. The new Soviet government in Moscow, however, was wary of the League of Nations Convention on the Demilitarization and Neutralization of the Åland Islands. The Soviets, not elected to participate in the League’s convention on Åland, declared that the conventions had no legal standing in the USSR due to Soviet non-participation in the negotiations (Rotkirch 1986). As the League’s successor, the UN legally recognises the League of Nations’ mandates. Russia could argue that since its predecessor, the USSR, does not recognise the 1920 mandates, their provisions don’t apply to Russia, making the argument that a Russian takeover of Åland difficult to argue that it violates international law.
Economical: A Russian presence in Åland, due to the islands’ strategic location, would severely disrupt local maritime shipping lines. Sweden’s mineral industry, especially in iron ore and other rare earth metals, is critical to the defence industry in Europe. Most of the minerals come from the northern Swedish city of Kiruna; maritime shipments mainly depart from the Norwegian port of Narvik or Sweden’s eastern port city of Luleå (LKAB; Moyer & Winberg 2024). Logistically, shipments from Luleå must travel near Åland on their journey throughout the Baltic or to the Atlantic, a shipping lane Russia could halt with its presence in Åland. With this, Russia could drastically harm Europe’s defence industry, especially in an age with dwindling American guarantees, forcing the EU to approach China for critical materials.
Social: A Russian operation on Åland would bring severe public anxiety and deepening polarization, an additional issue that Europe cannot afford at the moment. While the Ålanders have the right to determine the islands’ future, a Russian exploitation of the islands’ legal status would likely occur before the Finnish and Ålander governments could agree on a demilitarisation plan.
The War Game: How does Russia Exploit Åland’s Demilitarisation
Phase I of Russia’s potential takeover of Åland could involve a 'security crisis' that conveys aggression by NATO. Given Russia’s history of utilizing false flag operations, such as the ‘‘Finnish’’ shelling of the Russian village of Mainila as justification for the Russo-Finnish War of 1939 or the “Little Green Men” in Crimea in February 2014, a similar stunt near Åland is not out of the realm of possibility (BBC 2022). The catalyst could involve the damaging or seizing of a Russian-flagged maritime vessel or the presentation of fake intelligence of NATO anti-Russian measures. The potential impact on NATO is significant, especially if the Finnish Coast Guard performs the forcible seizure and the hypothetical vessel is docked in Mariehamn, Åland’s main port. In this scenario, the catalyst for the Russian operation is the hypothetical seizure by the Finnish coast guard of a Russian cargo ship traveling from St. Petersburg to Kaliningrad, carrying highly classified munitions and advanced technology unknown to NATO, somewhat echoing the Lusitania incident of 1915.
Moscow can’t simply send in a complete invasion force composed of infantry, naval, and aerial assets to take back their ship without starting WWIII. Their response will likely have to be some sort of specialized force, most probably the infamous Spetsnaz, similar to what was done in Crimea back in 2014 where Russia utilized small, mobile forces to take over an area of operation (AO). In this case, the takeover of Mariehamn’s port in a shock and awe operation (Bukkvoll 2016). If Putin’s special forces were to conduct such an operation, Moscow would put Finland into a serious legal and political limbo. Since Åland is considered Finnish territory, it is protected under NATO’s Article V. However, the islands’ demilitarisation is legally quadrupled locked in various treaties, creating a challenge that Helsinki may not want to pursue since Russia could argue that Finnish military operations on Åland violate the 1920 League of Nations mandate.
Finland’s coast guard represents the only troop presence in Mariehamn, meaning that the Spetsnaz would face little to no resistance taking the harbour. That said, Finland’s conscription system would allow Helsinki to mobilize very quickly if necessary, however Russia would likely threaten Finland with severe consequences, likely emboldened by the speculation of pending American withdrawals from Europe, meaning an end to the US nuclear umbrella (Bell & Hoffman 2025). Back on the ground in Mariehamn, the Spetsnaz would rapidly fortify the AO, leaving little room for the Finnish to respond. The annotated satellite image below, taken from Google Earth illustrates a potential battle plan. The red lines indicate a perimeter established around key infrastructure and urban access points to the harbour. Russian flags mark possible squad positions within the perimeter and across the harbour on the western peninsula. The deployment of Spetsnaz forces on the peninsula west of the harbour is needed to secure the main perimeter's flank and enable a two-pronged containment strategy. With this plan, the Russians will control the bay's entrance, allowing them to restrict maritime traffic and giving the Finnish a political, economical, and social nightmare.
Simultaneously, Russia could deploy its well-known cyber warfare forces, as conveyed in the Primakov Doctrine, often mistakenly called the Gerasimov Doctrine, to hack or cripple the power grid and NATO communications, hindering their response to a Russian operation in Mariehamn. With Åland being connected to the EU power grid, this could prompt a wider European response, potentially enabling a start to WWIII. With Finland blindsided, the strategic implications of a Russian move on Åland quickly escalated. The question now facing Helsinki is how to respond without triggering a broader conflict. Deploying elite units such as the Utin Jääkärirykmentti to retake the harbour may be considered, but such action carries the risk of confrontation with unpredictable consequences. Rather than acting unilaterally, Finland may turn to Sweden or consult with NATO allies, weighing the cost of escalation against the principle of territorial integrity.
Russia is unlikely to withdraw without some form of concession, presenting a high-stakes dilemma for Finland and the entire alliance. It is crucial that the alliance presents a united front in this situation. While certain NATO members, such as Hungary or the United States, might prefer a path of negotiation, others, including the Baltic states, could push for a stronger response, viewing the incursion as confirmation of long-standing warnings. Regardless of how the alliance proceeds, Russian control of Åland would significantly complicate NATO’s operations in the Baltic, offering Moscow a new strategic position close to the Finnish mainland and the Swedish capital.
Opportunities & Risks
Opportunities:
Strengthened Nordic-NATO Integration: The ongoing question of how to protect Åland with respect to the islands’ demilitarized status provides an ample opportunity to ramp up the continued integration of Finland and Sweden into NATO plans, forces, and command structure; NATO’s presence in Finland could be strengthened to provide a deterrent mechanism to possible Russian plans in Åland or the wider Baltic region.
Deterrence against Russian Provocations: A visible preparation for a defensive response in the region signals NATO’s resolve and addresses a potential Russian strategic advantage; by wargaming a possible Åland situation, NATO will be better prepared for potential threats from Moscow.
Risks:
Article V Ambiguity: Åland’s demilitarisation, supported by the 1920 League of Nations convention and Russia/Soviet lack of recognition, enables a legal grey zone. An operation in Åland would violate Finnish sovereignty, enacting Article V; however, Åland’s status protection under international law makes a response increasingly difficult, as Russia could use the Western response for justification.
Local Resistance and Political Fallout: A change in Åland’s status without the locals’ support would face backlash, eroding democratic legitimacy and complicating Helsinki’s domestic and regional policy.
Policy Recommendations
End Åland’s Demilitarisation: This decision is the straightforward approach to implementing a plan to defend against the hypothetical scenario presented in this article. However, as mentioned in the introduction, polls conducted by the Ålander parliament have indicated that the local population strongly favours continued demilitarisation. Therefore, Finland and its NATO allies have to find an alternative strategy; one solution to this obstacle is the creation of a joint Finnish-Swedish Åland Rapid Deployment Force, allowing the stationing of assets to the east and west of Åland.
Establishment of the Åland Rapid Deployment Force: Since Åland’s legal status prohibits the garrisoning of military forces on the island, establishing a joint rapid-reaction force is a viable alternative. With Finland's Coastal Fleet located at Pansio Naval Base in Turku, the facilities necessary to station significant naval assets are already in place (Merivoimat - Finnish Navy). Within one hour of Pansio Naval Base, the Finnish army and Air Force has local support elements with the Pori Brigade and Satakunta Air Command providing ample room for the Finnish part of the force to have combined arms capabilities. The Swedish meanwhile also have significant military resources in Stockholm due to the location of the Armed Forces HQ (Försvarsmakten - Swedish Armed Forces). Since Stockholm is further away from Mariehamn, the Swedish should establish a Firebase (FOB) with the Navy’s amphibious troops at either Grisslehamn or Kapellskär, two coastal villages due west of Mariehamn, to enable the Swedish to possess assets in greater proximity to Åland. With the creation of a joint response force within immediate proximity of Åland, it would serve as a deterrence mechanism to any Russians plans in the area.
Continue NATO Wargaming: Finland, Sweden, and NATO also need to simulate a Russian takeover of Åland in a military exercise around the islands, to ensure that the alliance is prepared for a worst case scenario like this. As mentioned in the war game section, Russia will likely utilize hybrid warfare tactics, a strategy that has proven successful for them on several occasions; therefore NATO needs to continue to facilitate the integration of Finland and Sweden into NATO’s hybrid warfare initiatives.
Conclusion
As this article conveys, Åland is a strategic weakness and political handicap for Finland, Sweden, and NATO. A hypothetical Russian exploitation of Åland’s demilitarisation would be disastrous for NATO unity and cohesion, especially when Trump continuously tests the alliance. While a new strategy for Åland’s defence is desperately needed, the Ålanders’ desire to remain demilitarized must be respected. However, only time will tell if Åland’s special status will survive the uncertainty looming over Europe’s geopolitical landscape or if it will falter to the strategic needs of Finland and the rest of NATO. A plan to protect Åland is vital, with Trump’s pressure of non-compliance with NATO. Threats of American withdrawals from the continent over European ‘free-loading’ shows that Europe must prepare a defence policy without the Americans, since the end of US security guarantees in Europe could embolden Russia to pursue its interest beyond Ukraine’s borders (Ross, Webber, Barigazzi, and Vinocur 2025; Paternoster 2025).